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ABSTRACT
Usable Secure Email Through Short-Lived Keys
Tyler Jay Monson
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
Participants from recent secure email user studies have expressed a need to use
secure email tools only a few times a year. At the same time, Internet users are expressing
concerns over the permanence of personal information on the Internet. Support for shortlived keys has the potential to address both of these problems. However, the short-lived
keys usability and security space is underdeveloped and unexplored. In this thesis, we
present an exploration of the short-lived keys usability and security design space. We
implement both a short-lived keys and a long-term keys secure email prototype. With
these two prototypes, we conduct a within-subjects user study. Results from our study
show that participants believe the short-lived keys prototype is more secure and more
trusted. Participants also provide feedback on what they want in a system supporting
short-lived keys. They also discuss how concerned they are about the permanence of their
information on the Internet and on their devices.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Despite the rapid growth of instant messaging and Internet chat, email remains an
important communication tool in homes and businesses [6]. While messaging applications
with end-to-end encryption, such as WhatsApp, have seen widespread adoption among
those with little or no computer security knowledge, secure email has yet to see such
adoption rates [27]. Without increased adoption of secure email tools, sensitive information
in emails will continue to be vulnerable to mail providers, governments, and malicious
entities.
The lack of end-to-end encryption in standard email leaves it vulnerable to malicious
entities. Even though many major email providers ensure emails are protected by Transport
Layer Security (TLS) while in transit to and from mail servers, most email providers do
not use encryption to protect emails they store on their mail servers [15]. Storing emails
in plaintext creates an opportunity for entities to obtain emails through several avenues.
For example, plaintext emails can be obtained through forceful compromise (e.g., hacking)
or legal action (e.g., subpoena). While plaintext emails let email providers filter spam,
they also present opportunities for data mining, targeted ads, and even stalking [21].
Further, many email users in the United States are unaware their government can exercise
provisions in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to lawfully obtain
emails that are at least 180 days old without a subpoena [24].
Applying end-to-end encryption to email is one way to overcome these vulnerabilities. End-to-end encryption secures email messages in transit and at rest. Most research
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on usable secure email focuses on long-term key management. However, long-term key
management has the potential to introduce usability and forward secrecy concerns. In
terms of usability concerns, novice security users tend to make mistakes and are prone
to feel overwhelmed when required to make long-term key management choices [38, 46].
Long-term keys pose a forward secrecy risk, because many secure messages are protected
by one key pair and may be exposed if the private key is compromised. Given these
concerns, long-term key management models may be insufficient to meet users’ usability
needs and concerns about information permanence.
Feedback from users in recent secure email studies has revealed that many users
want to use secure email, but only expect to utilize it a few times a year at most [29, 31, 34].
Some users also have fears about information permanence. This arises from uneasiness
about the permanent nature of personal information once it enters the Internet [25, 35, 44,
47]. This permanence of personal information can affect friendships, business reputations,
job opportunities, and more.
Secure email tools in general support long-term keys, placing increased demands
on users to perform necessary key management tasks. For example, users may be required
to securely store their keys, or securely move them from one device to another, but may
not know how to safely do so. Their inexperience may even lead them to divulge a private
key, or trust an unverified public key. In one lab study, a participant divulged their private
key while trying to send a secure email [30].
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Figure 1.1: Key management operations needed for long-term and short-lived keys.
Traditional secure email tools assume users will generate a single keypair to protect
their messages over the course of several years. If the private key is stolen, all encrypted
messages could be compromised. Secure email tools that support forward secrecy would
alleviate this concern, because compromised private keys would only be able to decrypt a
limited number of messages [9].
One approach to addressing these problems is using short-lived keys. With shortlived keys, key pairs expire after several secure messages are exchanged, or after some
period of time has passed. A tool using short-lived keys destroys public and private keys
as they expire. This means that users no longer need to manage a long-term key pair.
Instead, they generate, use, and destroy a key pair every time they send encrypted email.
This eliminates the need to store long term keys, as well as the need to transfer keys
between devices. Further, a level of forward secrecy is obtained since only a few messages
are encrypted with a single private key. In contrast to these benefits, short-lived keys
introduce an increased burden in terms of sharing, acquiring, and verifying new public
keys.
Short-lived keys have been mentioned in standards documents [11, 14] and discussed
in academic papers [8, 12, 37]. While these works introduce the challenges, benefits, and
3

design choices of short-lived keys, there has been no in-depth exploration of the concept.
Further, to the best of our knowledge, no secure email tool designed specifically to support
short-lived keys has been created or subjected to a user study.
In this thesis, we provide a detailed exploration of the short-lived keys design
space, including the usability and security trade-offs for a variety of short-lived keys design
choices. A short pilot study was conducted to further refine the results of this exploration.
This exploration and pilot study reveal that tools supporting short-lived keys have many
design alternatives. The results of this exploration can serve as a guide for designing and
implementing a short-lived keys prototype.
Using the MessageGuard framework [33], we implemented two secure email prototypes. Both prototypes utilize an email-based public key exchange. One prototype
supports a long-term keys model, while the other supports a short-lived keys model.
To understand the usability of our prototypes and about user perceptions of
information permanence, we conducted a within-subjects, paired-participant [31] user
study with a total of 24 participant pairs (48 participants total). Each participant in
the study completed secure email tasks and information permanence tasks with both
prototypes. Participants also participated in a 10–15 minute semi-structured exit interview
where they gave feedback on the prototypes, as well as their worries and perceptions of
information permanence in terms of messages on their devices and the Internet in general.
As we prepared for our user study, we made the following hypotheses:
• H1 : Users will believe the short-lived keys prototype is more secure than the
long-term keys prototype.
• H2 : Users will trust the short-lived keys prototype more than the long-term keys
prototype.
• H3 : The short-lived keys prototype will receive a higher Systems Usability Scale
score than the long-term keys prototype.
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The results of the study show a statistically significant difference between the
System Usability Scale scores of the short-lived keys and long-term keys prototypes.
These results are complicated by the long-term keys prototype not having functionality
for making secure email messages unreadable, while the short-lived keys prototype did.
While it is impossible to infer participants preferred short-lived keys over long-term keys,
qualitative results indicate that participants did have a strong preference for functionality
allowing them to make their secure messages unreadable.
Further analysis of the data gathered from the exit interviews indicate that
participants trusted the short-lived keys prototype more than the long-term keys prototype.
Further, participants felt the short-lived keys prototype was more secure than the other
prototype and they liked its ability to make messages unreadable at the push of a
button. Among other things, the qualitative results of this study also indicate that while
participants are not too concerned about the permanence of their messages or of their
information on the Internet, participants do employ various strategies to limit the sensitive
information they disclose online.
The contributions of this thesis are as follows:
An extensive evaluation of the usability and security of short-lived keys.
We explore short-lived keys security and usability design choices related to key coverage,
key expiration, automation of key destruction, presentation of encrypted messages, secure
long-term information storage, using multiple devices with short-lived keys, and key state
synchronization.
The first implementation and usability study of a short-lived keys secure
email prototype. To the best of our knowledge, a short-lived keys secure email prototype
has never been implemented or tested before.
Quantitative and qualitative results from a user study comparing secure
email prototypes with long-term keys and short-lived keys models. In general,
we gathered valuable feedback about our two prototypes, with much of the qualitative
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feedback clarifying quantitative results. Even though much of this feedback is focused on
short-lived keys in secure email, some of it applies to short-lived keys in other contexts
and some of it applies to the usability and security of secure email regardless of whether
short-lived keys are supported.
Feedback from participants showing they want ephemerality for emails
containing sensitive information. Odom et al. [26] showed users desire permanence
and ephemerality for different digital possessions. Displaying the importance of email
permanence in some cases, Cecchinato et al. show that email users frequently use email
archives to retrieve important information [13]. Others have proposed expiration dates
for email [43] and ephemerality for email [19]. In contrast to this related work, we have
gathered participant data showing users want their emails containing sensitive information
to be impermanent and want other emails to be permanent. This feedback is based on
participant experience with a secure email prototype that expires and makes secure emails
unreadable.
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Chapter 2
Background

This chapter contains an introduction to work related to usable secure email,
short-lived keys, and user concerns about the permanence of personal information.

2.1

Usability of Secure Email

Formal user studies of secure email started in 1999 when Whitten and Tygar [46] conducted
a user study of PGP 5.0. This study revealed that users were unable to successfully
send encrypted email due to key management difficulties and misunderstandings of the
cryptographic scheme at play. The results demonstrated to the security community that
security without usability does not lead to any practical security improvements for users.
Years later, Sheng et al. [38] conducted a pilot study comparing the usability of
PGP 9 to the results from Whitten and Tygar’s work [46]. They determined that users
still struggled with key management. Excessive hiding of cryptographic operations also
made users unsure whether the operations were executed. Other results outlined the need
for clearer interfaces to better guide user interaction with secure email software.
Garfinkel and Miller [17] conducted a modified version of the Johnny study [46]
with a secure email prototype based on S/MIME. Results from the study indicated
usability of secure email can be improved by applying automated key generation, key
management, and message signing. Usability data also suggested the prototype hid too
many cryptographic operations, indicating a balance needs to be struck between what is
revealed and what is kept hidden in the cryptography.
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Ruoti et al. [29] created and compared two versions of Pwm, a secure email
prototype utilizing Identity Based Encryption (IBE) [29]. Studies with these prototypes
showed users prefer secure email tools that integrate tightly with their webmail platform.
Other results showed users felt more secure using a secure email system with less hidden
cryptographic operations.
In response to the Johnny study [46], Tong et al. [40] developed a new set of
metaphors to help users better understand cryptographic actions. The new metaphors
were introduced to users using narratives centered on communication between King George
III and his subjects. Even though these lock and key metaphors did not “dramatically
outperform” standard PGP metaphors, far less documentation was required to help users
understand them.
In 2015, Atwater et al. [2] revisited a study by Ruoti et al. [29] by comparing a
standalone secure email prototype called MessageProtector to Mailvelope. Their results
indicate users still prefer to use secure email tools integrated into their webmail. They also
use their results to develop a set of principles for designing “consumer-friendly end-to-end
encryption tools”.
Bai et al. [3] conducted a user study evaluating the usability/security tradeoffs
users make while choosing a secure messaging tool. After receiving descriptions of the
security properties of the tested systems, participants recognized that the less-convenient
system was more secure and labeled the security of the more-convenient system as “good
enough”.
Ruoti et al. [31, 34] conducted several more secure email usability studies with
interesting results. One important study introduced a novel user study methodology that
uses pairs of participants to better simulate grassroots adoption scenarios of secure email
tools [31]. User pairs acted more naturally in the user study scenarios, because they were
acquainted with each other before starting the study. In another study, Ruoti et al. [34]
leveraged past work [29, 31, 33] to create, adapt, and use MessageGuard to compare secure
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email prototypes using three different key management schemes. Using MessageGuard
as a base for the three prototypes removed confounding factors from the usability study
of the three prototypes. This allowed for the usability of the key management schemes
themselves to be more directly compared.

2.2

Short-Lived Keys and Forward Secrecy

The earliest work discussing the utility of short-lived keys is from Schneier and Hall [37]
in 1997. The work argues that past, present, and future messages can be exposed if
attackers compromise a private key by guessing the key or by guessing the password
protecting it. One defense against this vulnerability is minimizing the sensitive messages
that are protected by one key pair. This defensive measure provides a form of forward
secrecy as more and more key pairs are used to secure different messages. The work also
argues for short-lived keys being signed by a long-term key pair to enable the owner of
the short-lived key to be identified.
Brown et al. [12] expounded on Schneier and Hall’s discussion of short-lived keys.
The ideas presented in this work were later included in an Internet Draft titled “Forward
Secrecy Extensions for OpenPGP” [11]. In contrast to Schneier and Hall’s work, these
documents focus more on discussing the logistics and usability of short-lived keys. They
argue that short-lived keys require different key management than long-term keys. For
example, the timeliness of destroying a private key is crucial in a short-lived key model.
Brown also discusses one potential complication for short-lived keys—worse usability. Brown presents this complication as a cost tradeoff between security and key
distribution. This tradeoff is made as short-lived keys trade higher security for more
complicated key management. While a more complicated key management method may
inflict more usability problems overall, it is argued that these usability problems can
be limited by strategically applying automation. For example, new key pairs can be
automatically generated in the background and new public keys can be automatically
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attached to emails as they are sent. The need for key expiration and key revocation
warnings are also discussed.
Both documents state that data secured by short-lived keys can be extracted,
encrypted, and stored locally using a long-term key. This scenario is necessary if encrypted data is needed after the key pair protecting the data expires. Transmitting data
protected by a short-lived key and storing it locally with a long-term key reflects security
recommendation 7-3 from NIST’s recent document on Trustworthy Email [14].
Finally, Brown et al. [12] also argue that one-time keys, public/private key pairs
used only for securing a single message, are the logical conclusion of a short-lived keys.
In the context of using one-time keys to secure email, Brown et al. further argue that the
nature of email is better suited to an offline key exchange scheme.
Short-lived keys are also discussed in Boneh and Franklin’s seminal work detailing
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) [8]. In IBE, a user proves their identity to a key server
to gain access to a private key generated with a string related to their identity (e.g.,
email address). Other users can request individual public keys based on identity strings.
IBE enables short-lived keys by combining an identity string with a date string. In one
scenario, a new private and public key is generated for each user every day using their
identity string and the date. This forces users to obtain a new private key every day so
they can decrypt new messages. The paper indicates this system would be more feasible
to use and maintain in a corporate environment. This work does not discuss the disposal
of private keys or any usability concerns related to key management.
Off-the-Record Communication (OTR), outlined by Borisov et al. [9], uses shortlived keys to obtain confidentiality, perfect forward secrecy, and repudiability on instant
messaging platforms. A prototype of OTR was implemented for a Linux-based instant
messenger, but was not tested in a formal user study. This work outlines some of
the challenges related to short-lived keys, such as the challenges inherent in securely
synchronizing short-lived keys. Even though OTR is described as impractical for email,
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OTR can be used in email if two individuals communicate frequently and don’t expect
their initial message to be encrypted. Borisov et al. explain this is possible through the
use of ring signatures [28].
Topalovic et al. [41] outlined a system for short-lived HTTPS certificates designed
to replace OCSP. In this system, certificates are only vulnerable to compromise for
several days, because they have short lifespans. It requires web servers to fetch their
new short-lived certificates periodically. This necessitates the Certificate Authority (CA)
to have an online system that is more vulnerable to attacks and fraudulent activities.
While short-lived certificates is a promising idea, it suffers from a complicated deployment
process. This system might be helpful in developing a short-lived keys secure email
prototype based on S/MIME. Implementing a prototype like this from the ground up
wouldn’t encounter the same deployment problems encountered with deploying short-lived
certificates in the wild.
While some short-lived certificates systems are being discussed in theory, there
is one system currently in place for short-lived certificates. Let’s Encrypt

1

offers a free

service for obtaining, reviewing, and renewing HTTPS certificates. With Let’s Encrypt,
HTTPS certificates are valid for 3 months before they need to be renewed. Obtaining
and renewing certificates with this system is almost completely automated.
More recently, Green and Miers [18] published a paper introducing Puncturable
Encryption, a novel approach to “forward secure encryption”. Puncturable Encryption
allows a user to update their decryption key such that it cannot decrypt messages before a
certain date. An interesting property of this system is that it does not require redistribution
of keys after the decryption key is updated. This system achieves forward-secure messaging
and only adds low overhead in the process. While this work is compelling, it is fairly new
and its cryptographic constructions have yet to receive the same security vetting that
other systems, such as PGP, have undergone.
1

https://letsencrypt.org/
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2.3

Availability and Permanence of Personal Information

As time passes, more and more sources indicate Internet users are concerned about their
information being accessible on the Internet. Ruoti et al. [35] conducted semi-structured
interviews to understand how individuals perceive online risks. Several of the participants
voiced concerns about the permanence of personal information on the Internet. One
participant even stated, “nothing can be forgotten again.” Participants also expressed
concerns about government entities hacking into and accessing personal information stored
on the Internet.
In another study by Munson et al. [25], individuals expressed concerns about
modern technology making public records readily available. Work by Wang et al. [44]
shows social media users are worried about unintended audiences seeing their posts, which
may lead to job loss or relationship complications. Finally, Woodruff [47] conducted a
“qualitative study of how users manage their reputations online.” The work shows that
a damaged reputation not only affects one’s career, academic, and social opportunities,
but may also inflict emotional and physical harm. In essence, participants in this study
indicated that information shared through the Internet inherently becomes “property of
the entire world.”
While these works display important attitudes and coping strategies Internet users
have regarding the permanence of their information on the Internet, they focus on specific
forms of information or Internet mediums. Further, they do not specifically explore how
worried users are about this subject.
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Chapter 3
Short-Lived Keys Design Exploration

This chapter explores the design options for short-lived keys. These choices are
either not discussed or only briefly mentioned by the current short-lived keys literature.
Generally, the current short-lived keys literature only touches the surface of short-lived
keys design options, because their discussions are strictly based on theoretical short-lived
keys systems. The exploration of the design options discussed in this chapter was based
on the goal of designing and producing a highly usable secure email prototype supporting
short-lived keys. Working with this goal in mind required many design options to be
discovered, recorded, compared, and discussed.

3.1

Initial Design Exploration

Initial exploration of the design space of short-lived keys started with and branched out
from the short-lived keys concepts presented by Brown et al. [11, 12], as well as Schneier
and Hall [37]. However, due to the lack of related work for short-lived keys in email,
many of the design options were generated using previous secure email research and
through brainstorming the potential needs of users based on short-lived keys in a secure
email context. Some of the most important design option categories produced by this
exploration are introduced in the following subsections. Each subsection contains a list of
research questions relevant to the design option category discussed in the section.
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3.1.1

Key Expiration vs. Key Destruction

This thesis assumes the following definitions for key expiration and key destruction:
Key Expiration: A key is considered expired when it has been marked for destruction, but still exists in some form on the user’s device. The public and private portions of
asymmetric key pairs both expire at the same time. An expired key may be unmarked
for destruction if the owner decides it is still needed.
Key Destruction: The point at which a short-lived key has been completely
forgotten, meaning there is no digital or physical record of it. The minimal requirement
for an asymmetric key pair achieving destruction is when no physical or digital record of
its private key exists. In this case, an asymmetric key pair is considered destroyed even
when multiple copies of its public key exist in some way.
3.1.2

Key Coverage

Short-lived keys are not only defined by their expiration parameters, but also by what they
protect. For example, a short-lived key A may have a lifespan of 1 week, but may only
be allowed to protect 1 message. Another short-lived key B may have the same lifespan,
but may be allowed to protect any number of messages sent within its lifespan. Brown et
al. [12] state the “logical conclusion” of short-lived keys is one-time keys, where every
encrypted message is protected by a different key. While this approach provides obvious
forward secrecy benefits not provided by other approaches, this approach may introduce
usability challenges not encountered in other approaches. For example, requiring frequent
key exchanges may become burdensome to the user in a one-time short-lived keys scheme.
We identified and explored a set of design options related to what short-lived keys
can protect (key coverage).
• Protect N Messages: Short-lived keys can be defined to protect N messages.
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– N = 1: Can frequent key exchange usability challenges be overcome? If so,
how?
– N > 1: Can N be chosen such that reasonable degrees of security and usability
are obtained?
• Protect by Logical Grouping: Keys can protect a logical grouping of messages, such
as a thread of emails, or an instant messaging conversation with one contact.
– Which logical groupings of messages will users find to be usable?
• Protect by Time Period: A short-lived key can be defined to protect all messages
received within the lifespan of the key. Design options for key lifespans are further
discussed in Section 3.1.3.
• Combination: A key can protect messages using a combination of the approaches
listed above. For example, a short-lived key could be defined to protect only five
messages from a single email thread.
3.1.3

Key Expiration and Lifespan

Short-lived keys can be defined to expire after a certain period of time, or after specific
events occur. For example, a key can be set to expire two weeks after it is first generated,
or can be set to expire after a message it protects has been read for the first time. While
giving a short-lived key a lifespan based on time is not required, it may be important
to do so to ensure short-lived keys actually expire. For example, a short-lived key may
never expire if it is defined to expire after a certain event because that event may never
occur. In this case, it may be safer to define the key to expire after the event, but also
expire at a specific time in case the event never occurs. Inherently, design choices made
in this category may be dictated by or may dictate design choices from other categories
discussed in this exploration.
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• Time-Based Expiration: Short-lived keys are defined to expire on a certain date or
after a certain period of time has passed.
– How long should a short-lived key go before expiring?
∗ 1-2 days?
∗ 1-2 weeks?
∗ 1 month?
∗ Longer than 1 month?
∗ What usability and security trade–offs are made as the expiration time
grows longer or shorter?
– Expiration Timer Start: When should the expiration timer start for a shortlived key?
∗ When the key is generated?
∗ When the public key has been shared?
∗ When an encrypted message protected by the key has been opened for the
first time?
• Event-Based Expiration: Short-lived keys expire when a specific event or set of
events are fulfilled.
– Examples:
∗ A key expires after a user has read an encrypted message N times.
∗ A key expires when a related key has expired/destroyed.
∗ A key expires when a message has been received.
– Are there any cases where event-based expiration does not need time-based
expiration as a backup?
• User Control: What level of control should users be given over any of these options?
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3.1.4

Automation of Key Management

In the context of short-lived keys, deciding the level of automation of key management in
a secure email tool is an important topic. At first, it seems like an obvious choice to take
the burden off users by providing completely automatic key management. Doing this has
the potential to prevent users from feeling overwhelmed and making errors. However,
complete automation of key management, while helpful, can also lead to some users to
lose trust in the software. Short-lived keys introduce further usability concerns related
to automated key management. For example, users may become frustrated if they can’t
read their encrypted email after the tool automatically deletes the expired short-lived
key protecting the encrypted message. In this case, giving the user the choice between
keeping or destroying their expired key could prevent confusion and frustration.
While the choice of applying complete automation to some key management
tasks is more subjective, some key management tasks stand out as obvious choices
for the application of complete automation. For example, any encryption keys should
automatically be generated when needed. Further, any key data being passed between
those participating in the secure information exchange should be passed, extracted, and
stored automatically. Other obvious automation applications include, but are not limited
to: verifying email DKIM signatures if needed (see Chapter 4), properly erasing short-lived
keys from the devices, as well as choosing the appropriate keys for encrypting, signing,
and verifying signatures.
One of the more difficult and important design choices related to the automation
of key management in a short-lived keys tool is key destruction. As stated above, a
short-lived key automatically destroyed by a tool has the potential to frustrate and confuse
users. Finding a solution to this problem that gives users both security and usability is
an important part of our exploration of this design choice. An important set of questions
related to this design decision is:
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• What level of automation, if any, should be applied to key destruction in a secure
email tool using short-lived keys?
– Should key destruction be completely automatic? This implies a secure email
tool will destroy a short-lived key as soon as possible after it has expired. If
the software is only run at certain times (for example, a chrome extension only
running when a Chrome browser window is open), when will it be possible to
destroy the keys?
– Should key destruction be partially automatic? For example, the secure email
tool prompts a user to choose between destroying or keeping a short-lived key
once it has expired.
– Should key destruction be completely manual? In this case, choosing to destroy
keys is completely left to the user. They will not be reminded to destroy
anything.
– What are the usability and security trade-offs of these different options?
3.1.5

Presentation of Encrypted Messages

Secure email tools using long-term keys often have an indicator that a message is encrypted.
While this is helpful in the context of a long-term keys secure email tool, more visual
information may be needed to help users understand the status of their emails encrypted
with short-lived keys. The following questions summarize the exploration we did related
to the presentation of encrypted messages protected by short-lived keys in a secure email
tool.
• Should specialized user interface elements be included to help users know of the
expiration of the keys protecting their emails?
• Should a view or folder outside of the normal email inbox be created for these
messages?
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• Should expiration labels be added to views related to messages protected by shortlived keys?
– Should the text of the label display the short-lived key’s expiration date?
– Should the label display an active countdown to the expiration of the short-lived
key?
– What color(s) should this label be assigned?
– What color should this label be?
3.1.6

Long-Term Encrypted Information Storage

If a short-lived key is about to expire, users may want to easily, quickly, and securely
store the information protected by that key elsewhere for long-term use.
• Should long-term storage of this information be left to the user?
• Should an archive feature be provided for automatic information extraction and
secure storage?
• If a secure archive feature is used, how should it protect information?
– Should they be protected by one master password, or by a unique password
for each message?
– Should a long-term key pair be used for this purpose?
3.1.7

Multiple Devices

Another potentially important aspect of designing a usable secure email tool based on
short-lived keys are the challenges related to accessing encrypted email on multiple devices.
If Alice initially sent an encrypted email from device A, the private key will most likely
exist on device A. However, Alice will not be able read that same email on device B,
because device B does not have access to the private key stored on device A. In this
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scenario, Alice may need to be informed which of her devices can actually access the
encrypted message.
• Should private short-lived keys be shared between devices?
– What processes and cryptographic schemes can be employed to do this securely?
– How does sharing private keys complicate completely destroying short-lived
keys?
• If private keys are not shared among user devices, what is the best way to help the
user understand which device they need to open the encrypted message on?
– Can short-lived keys be bound to device descriptions, allowing a short-lived
keys tool to notify the user which device they should read from?
3.1.8

Sender/Recipient Key State Synchronization

Another challenge introduced by short-lived keys is synchronizing the keys between
participants in an encrypted communication session. This challenge is illustrated by the
following scenario and questions. Consider Alice and Bob communicating securely, each
using their own short-lived key. Alice decides she wants to end the secure communication
session and destroys her short-lived key. Bob, not knowing Alice destroyed her key,
sends her additional encrypted information using her public key. Alice can’t decrypt the
information because she has destroyed her private key.
• What design choices can we make to avoid the problems associated with the above
scenario?
• Should Alice’s short-lived keys secure email tool automatically inform Bob when
she has deleted a key?
• Is there ever a case where the outcome of this scenario is desirable?
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• What usability features need to be considered to help Bob understand what it
means for Alice to destroy her key?
3.1.9

Design Exploration Discussion

A wide set of implementation choices are available within each design category. Further,
the usability and security of these implementation choices may vary based on the context
of the short-lived keys application and based on specific user needs. For example, some
different implementation choices become apparent assuming an encrypted text message
application based on short-lived keys as opposed to a secure email tool using short-lived
keys.

3.2

Pilot Study

This section contains details about short-lived keys secure email design choice hypotheses
we made after our design exploration. Also included are details about the methodology
and results of a pilot study we conducted to gather early feedback on the design choice
hypotheses.
3.2.1

Hypotheses

After exploring, recording, and comparing these short-lived keys design options, we made
educated guesses on specific design choices in the context of secure email. For example,
we hypothesized that users would like each short-lived key to protect a different email
thread. This hypothesis was made with the assumption that email threads generally
contain related information, where some pieces of information depend on or are related to
other information in other thread messages. We further hypothesized that users would
be interested in short-lived keys initially starting with an expiration of 2 weeks, then
immediately drop to an expiration of 2 days after the first message of the secured thread
is read. This hypothesis assumed that some users may not be able to access their email
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for several days based on their life activities. Further, we assumed users would appreciate
the added forward secrecy provided by dropping the expiration period to two days after
the first message was opened.
Our exploration of the short-lived keys design choices also led us to develop several
more hypotheses about a usable, secure short-lived keys secure email tool. For example,
we hypothesized that users would want expiration labels on inbox email headers and
email thread headers for messages protected by short-lived keys. We guessed that users
would find it helpful to have a timer on these labels that displayed days, hours, minutes,
and seconds left until expiration. These labels would actively count down the seconds left
until expiration, making it clear to users that messages expire.
In regard to the automation of key destruction, we hypothesized users would want
a partially automatic approach with an option to manually destroy short-lived keys as
they please. This design decision would remind users to manage expired keys and would
allow them to destroy keys without waiting for them to expire first.
We also made some initial hypotheses on the text to be shown on several buttons
we expected to add to the user interface of a short-lived keys secure email tool. We
hypothesized that potential users would understand the function of a button with the
text “Make Unreadable” if the function of the button were to destroy the short-lived
key protecting an email thread. Further, we hypothesized that potential users would
understand that an email inbox header and an email thread header label with the text
“Expired” means that the secure messages would still be accessible, but that action should
be taken to make the secure messages permanently inaccessible.
3.2.2

Methodology

The pilot study involved conducting a short (7 - 8 minute), semi-structured interview
with random volunteers around the Brigham Young University campus. Participants
were asked a set of questions strictly related to a hypothetical short-lived keys secure
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email tool. Where appropriate, participants were shown images of user interface mock-ups
based on our design choice hypotheses. Instead of introducing the idea of short-lived keys
to users during the interview, we strictly referred to messages/threads expiring. Further,
instead of expressing the idea of the destruction of a short-lived key, users were told
messages/threads could become unreadable or inaccessible.
A total of 16 participants agreed to take part in this pilot study. Several were
visitors to the Brigham Young University campus, while most were either BYU students
or BYU faculty/employees. The interview outline and UI mockups for the pilot study
can be found in Appendix A. No personally identifying information was collected during
the study.
3.2.3

Results

When asked about expiration time periods, users gave diverse answers. While some
indicated they would feel more comfortable with messages expiring after a day or two,
others suggested it would be best to let messages expire after 6 months or even a 1 year.
Other users fell into the middle of these two extremes, suggesting 2 weeks or 1 month
would be most appropriate. A common theme throughout all this feedback was that
expiration timing should depend on the context of the secure communication. While some
indicated expiration timing should change based on who they are communicating with,
others suggested expiration timing should change based on the kind of information being
shared securely.
While most of the pilot study participants in general liked the idea of an expiration
label for emails that expire, about half of them did not like the idea of the expiration
label actively counting down the seconds until expiration. This countdown design choice
was described as “stressful” and “overkill”.
On the topic of the automation of short-lived key destruction, users were asked
what the secure email prototype should do once an encrypted message expires. They
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were given the option to have the messages become unreadable automatically, partially
automatically, manually, or some combination of automatic and manual action. Most
of the participants expressed interest in the partially automatic approach involving a
popup asking users what to do with expired messages. Many of these same participants
expressed a need for a manual option to make messages unreadable so they wouldn’t have
to wait days for a message to expire before being given the option to make the message
inaccessible. While several participants advocated for a completely manual approach,
partially due to their disdain for popups and notifications, not a single participant was
interested in the fully automatic approach.
When participants were asked how they would want their encrypted messages
bundled in terms of protection and expiration, a majority of participants indicated they
would prefer this to work on a thread level. Several participants expressed a desire for the
ability to let individual email messages expire and a few even wanted to have the option
for protection and expiration to work both on a thread and individual message basis.
In terms of button text, a majority of participants indicated the text “Make
Unreadable” would best describe a button that makes encrypted messages permanently
inaccessible. While many users expressed support for the text ”Expired” on a label for a
message that expired, several participants supported the use of text like “Overdue” and
“Unresolved”.
Finally, pilot study participants were asked about the possible situations the
hypothetical short-lived keys secure email prototype could be used for. Several cited
personal use situations, such as sending phone numbers, social security numbers, bank
statements, etc. On the other hand, many of the participants listed professional or
government contexts to use this prototype within. Some of these less personal contexts
included sending confidential information within schools, business, government research
labs, meeting government guidelines, and national security.
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Chapter 4
Prototype Design

This chapter contains details regarding the design of the two secure email prototypes
we implemented to test in our user study. First, we introduce the threat model we use to
guide the design of our prototypes. Next, we introduce MessageGuard, the framework we
use to implement these prototypes. After that, we give details on the design of the two
prototypes. These details start with an introduction to PGP, the underlying cryptographic
system used in our two prototypes. Next, details on the key exchange process used in
both prototypes are given. Finally, information about specific design and implementation
choices is provided for each of the prototypes.

4.1

Threat Model

Our threat model includes the following three entities:
1. User: The user’s computer, operating system, Internet browser, and secure email
software are considered part of the trusted computing base.
2. Webmail Provider: This entity is considered an honest-but-curious party 1 . The
webmail provider has access to public keys, but not private keys. Further, this
entity will not alter emails and other data. For example, a webmail provider under
this condition will not change a public key sent by a user in an email.
1

An honest-but-curious party will gather any information available to them (e.g., Gmail scans email
messages), but will not attempt to break the secure email system (e.g., impersonating the user) or collude
with other honest-but-curious parties.
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3. Adversary: This entity is free to eavesdrop on, intercept, and alter any communication between users and webmail providers. For instance, an adversary under this
condition may change a public key sent with an email. The adversary wins if they
can use these resources to access the plaintext contents of the encrypted email body.
Directs attacks against the user, such as credential phishing, malware, viruses,
etc., are outside the scope of this threat model. In addition, both an attacker that can
compromise the webmail provider or a government that can legally coerce the webmail
provider are also outside the scope of this threat model. We do not consider an attacker who
can compromise fundamental networking primitives (i.e., TLS, DNS), because someone
with this capability can already do far more damage than compromising secure email. In
our threat model, the main concern is keeping the user’s encrypted information secure.
Thus, some information, such as email addresses and email headers, may be visible to the
adversary while being transferred between webmail servers.
An adversary has two attack vectors for obtaining the encrypted information sent
by a user. In the first vector, an adversary must compromise the public/private keys
protecting the information and it must obtain the encrypted message itself. The encrypted
message can be obtained by compromising a webmail server, or by eavesdropping on an
insecure connection. User private key(s) are only stored on the user’s device and may be
impossible to obtain given this model’s restriction on direct attacks and the definition of
the user’s secure computing base.
In the second option, an adversary can intercept emails containing public keys and
replace the original public key with their own. The recipient of the adversary’s public
key might encrypt sensitive information using the adversary’s public key instead of the
original public key. If an adversary can obtain that encrypted message, they will be able
to decrypt it. However, details about DKIM verification in Section 4.4.2 may provide a
degree of verification to key exchange data reducing the severity of this problem.
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Compared to the traditional PGP threat model, our threat model is rather permissive. However, Ruoti et al. [32] provide several examples of situations in which this
kind of threat model is useful.

4.2

MessageGuard

MessageGuard is a platform designed by Ruoti et al. [33] enabling quick prototyping
of secure email tools that tightly integrate with Gmail. The platform separates key
management functionality from the user interface, allowing designers to maintain many user
interface characteristics across prototypes with different encryption and key management
schemes. This architecture allows for user interface confounding factors to be reduced
as the usability of prototypes with different encryption systems are compared. Ruoti et
al. [34] used MessageGuard to rapidly prototype, refine, and compare three secure email
prototypes based on IBE, PGP, and password security models.
We used MessageGuard as a platform to develop the two secure email prototypes
used in our user study. Using this platform allowed us to focus on developing the specific
key management functionality and user interface features of our two prototypes, instead
of investing time up front developing our own email software from scratch. Developing
our prototypes with MessageGuard also provided the benefits of unencrypted greetings in
encrypted emails, tools to create inline tutorials, and a framework for working with data
packages included in emails sent with MessageGuard.

4.3

PGP

Both of our prototypes were designed to use Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [16, 50] as
their underlying cryptographic system. PGP is an end-to-end encryption system based
on public key cryptography. This system allows users to both encrypt and sign their
messages. Historically, PGP has been known to be unusable by novices users [17, 38, 46].
However, Ruoti et al. [34] recently used MessageGuard to implement a secure email
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prototype supporting a PGP model that relies on a public key server [3] for sharing and
distributing public keys. Compared to earlier studies, results from a user study with this
prototype show promising usability scores and usability feedback for this prototype.

4.4

Key Exchange Model

While Ruoti et al. [34] used a public key server [3] to exchange public keys, we took
another approach for key exchanges in our prototypes. For both prototypes, public
keys are exchanged through email messages. An email-based key exchange was chosen
over a public key server to allow for an exploration of the usability of an email-based
key exchange, as well as a simple exploration of DKIM public key verification. The
key exchange process implemented is based on the scenario of Bob sending encrypted
information to Alice. It is diagrammed in Figure 4.4 and is described below:
1. Bob generates a public/private key pair if he doesn’t have one for this exchange
(see the details in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 for more details on how this works for each
prototype). He generates a symmetric key K and uses it to encrypt his message.
As he sends the encrypted message in an email, he attaches his public key to the
email in case Alice wants to send him an encrypted message in the future.
2. After receiving Bob’s email, Alice generates a public/private key pair if she doesn’t
have one for this exchange (see the details in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 for more details
on how this is done for each prototype).
3. Alice sends her public key to Bob in an email. The contents of this email, including
Alice’s public key, can be encrypted for added security since Alice has Bob’s public
key.
4. Bob encrypts the symmetric key K using Alice’s public key and sends her the
encrypted symmetric key K in an email.
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5. Alice uses her private key to decrypt the symmetric key, then uses the symmetric
key to decrypt the original message.

Figure 4.1: Public key exchange model used in both secure email prototypes in this study.
4.4.1

Application of Automation

In an effort to improve the usability of the key exchange and help prevent users from
making mistakes, automation was strategically applied to the key exchange process. While
automation is present in the five steps of the key exchange shown in Figure 4.4, several
manual steps need to be taken by users to complete the key exchange. The steps below
provide details on the way automation was applied to these five steps and also include
information about manual action users are required to take to continue the key exchange:
Step 1
29

• Manual Actions: Bob turns on encryption, composes his message, then clicks “Send
Encrypted”.
• Automated Actions: In the short-lived keys prototype, a new public/private key
pair is generated for Bob to be used with the newly created thread. Bob’s public
key is attached to the email containing the encrypted message.
Step 2
• Manual Actions: Alice must open the email in Gmail after installing the prototype
if necessary.
• Automated Actions: In the short-lived keys prototype, a new public/private key
pair is automatically generated for Alice once she opens Bob’s first encrypted email
on this thread. Both prototypes automatically store Bob’s public key for later use.
Step 3
• Manual Actions: Alice must click the “Send Access Request” button on the overlay
of the encrypted message. This step could have been automated, but we decided to
make this a manual action to give users the choice to not continue key exchange.
This gives Alice more control in the situation that she doesn’t want to decrypt the
email because she simply doesn’t want to, or because she doesn’t trust the source
of the encrypted email.
• Automated Actions: Once Alice clicks the “Send Access Request” button, the
prototype automatically sends an access request email to Bob. Among other data,
this email contains Alice’s public key.
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Figure 4.2: When Alice opens the encrypted message from Bob, she has the option to
request access to the message. Doing so continues the key exchange.

Figure 4.3: If Alice chooses to send an access request, the prototypes automatically send
an access request email to Bob. Along with other data, the access request contains Alice’s
public key.
Step 4
• Manual Actions: Bob opens Alice’s access request email.
• Automated Actions: Once the access request is opened, the prototypes recognize
and parse the request. Both prototypes store Alice’s public key for later use. Alice’s
public key is used to encrypt symmetric message key K. The encrypted symmetric
key K is automatically sent to Alice in a reply email.

Figure 4.4: When Bob opens the encrypted thread after Alice sends an access request, the
prototypes automatically respond with an access response containing symmetric message
key K encrypted with Alice’s public key.
Step 5
• Manual Actions: Alice must open the thread containing the access response that
contains the encrypted symmetric key K.
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• Automated Actions: Once the thread is opened, the prototypes automatically
recognize the access response, extract and store the encrypted symmetric key K.
Once Alice opens the original encrypted message, the prototypes automatically
decrypt symmetric key K and use it to decrypt the encrypted message. If the
original encrypted message is already showing, the prototype will automatically
decrypt it and display the decrypted data.

Figure 4.5: Once Alice opens the thread with Bob’s access response, the prototypes
extract the encrypted symmetric message key and store it.

Figure 4.6: Alice can now decrypt symmetric key K and use it to decrypt the original
encrypted message.
4.4.2

DKIM Verification

DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) [1, 15] operates on the domain level for authentication
and integrity. When Alice sends an email to Bob using Gmail, Gmail servers use a Gmail
domain private key to sign the body of Alice’s email. When Bob’s email provider
receives this email, it can request Gmail’s domain public key to be used for verifying
the signature. While DKIM doesn’t have ubiquitous deployment [15], many widely used
webmail providers, such as Gmail and Yahoo, utilize it. Although not implemented in
the prototypes for this work, DKIM is a viable protocol for gaining a greater degree of
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verification that any key exchange data, including public keys, have not been spoofed or
tampered with.
To be clear, DKIM signatures do not provide verification for email headers, because
the signature itself is included as an email header. Instead, a DKIM signature provides
verification for the body of an email. This detail makes it clear any key exchange data
requiring verification through DKIM must reside in the body of the email. For example,
public keys shared as part of a key exchange through email should be part of the body of
the email and should not be sent as part of any email header, even the subject header.
A future, more robust implementation of the prototypes could include features
that check DKIM signatures, providing greater assurance that key exchange data has
not been tampered with. While DKIM doesn’t specify what the reciever should do with
an email with an invalid DKIM signature, it may be important to give users a warning
that the security of the email has been compromised. [15]. Thus, while this feature brings
security benefits, it may also introduce usability challenges in terms of properly warning
users of the implications of invalid signatures.
4.4.3

Alternate Key Exchange Scenario

A key exchange process for the situation where Alice wants to request sensitive information
from Bob was not implemented in either of our prototypes. For simplicity, we assumed
users interacting with this prototype could easily send an email requesting this information
from their contact. In this request, users would have to provide their own information on
how to find and install the prototype. Once Bob installs the prototype, he can send an
encrypted message to Alice and they can complete the key exchange as seen in Figure 4.4.
Another way this could work with our prototypes is Alice sending an encrypted message
to Bob with her request for sensitive information either in the unencrypted greeting or in
the encrypted portion of her message.
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Given that the scenario of Alice requesting sensitive information from Bob may be
just as likely to occur as Bob initially sending Alice encrypted information, it may be
important to streamline this process in future work. For example, functionality can be
added to our prototypes allowing Alice to send her public key to Bob in her plaintext email
requesting the information. This hypothetical prototype would also attach instructions
on how to install the prototype to Alice’s initial request email. An example of this key
exchange process can be seen in Figure 4.4.3.

Figure 4.7: An alternate key exchange model based on Alice requesting sensitive information from Bob.
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4.5

Long-Term Keys Secure Email Prototype

This prototype was designed based on more traditional long-term key management
principles. This section contains details relevant to the design and implementation choices
we made as we developed this prototype. Appropriate details are provided to stress the
differences between this prototype and the short-lived keys prototype further discussed in
Section 4.6.
4.5.1

Key Management

This prototype was designed to use a long-term key management scheme. Essentially, this
means that only one public/private key pair is generated for users. It is generated during
the setup phase of the tool and is used for all secure communication. For example, Alice,
Jane, and Johnny will all use the same public key to encrypt symmetric keys that protect
the information they send to Bob. One implication of this long-term key management
approach is that users only need to go through our key exchange process described in
Section 4.4 the first time they start securely communicating another person. This means
that Bob will not send his long-term public key to Alice again if he has already sent
it to her before. Thus, if Bob has exchanged encrypted email with Alice before, in the
future, he can send her an encrypted message that she can immediately decrypt. A user’s
long-term key pair is stored in encrypted local storage until the prototype is uninstalled.
4.5.2

Prototype Setup

One important difference between this prototype and the short-lived keys prototype is the
setup process. This prototype requires the user to enter the email address they will use
with the prototype. Once their email address is entered, their long-term public/private key
pair is generated and it is essentially bound to the supplied email address. The prototype
is limited to only working with the email account related to the address provided by the
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user during setup. Future work on this prototype could expand the capabilities of the
prototype to work with multiple email accounts.
4.5.3

Making Encrypted Messages Inaccessible

As presented in Section 5.2.2, one of our user study tasks asks user study participants to
make their encrypted messages inaccessible. We did not provide any direct functionality
in the long-terms keys prototype for doing this. The limitations of our results introduced
by excluding this functionality are discussed in the results and other concluding sections
of this work. To make encrypted messages inaccessible with this prototype, users need to
delete messages, sending them to the trash. From there, they either need to use Gmail’s
“Delete Forever” button, or let the message sit in the trash folder for 30 days before Gmail
automatically deletes it forever.
4.5.4

User Interface

This prototype has inline tutorials similar to those seen in work by Ruoti et al. [31, 32, 34].
User interface elements, such as the green “Encrypted” labels on MessageGuard email
thread headers, are nearly identical to those found in the aforementioned works.

Figure 4.8: Green “Encrypted” labels are placed on the headers of encrypted message
threads.
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Figure 4.9: Inline tutorials for composing encrypted messages and reading encrypted
messages are provided to help users learn more about the prototype.

4.6

Short-Lived Keys Secure Email Prototype

Design and implementation choices we made for our short-lived keys prototype were based
on our initial short-lived keys design exploration and pilot study presented in Chapter 3.
The design and implementation of this prototype was further refined throughout the
design iterations discussed in Section 4.7.
4.6.1

Key Management

Key management for this prototype is based on a short-lived keys model. We applied the
following characteristics to our short-lived keys model:
• Key Generation: Keys are generated at two different times based on the roles
being played in the encrypted information exchange.
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– Initial Sender: If Bob is initially sending an encrypted message to Alice, his
short-lived key pair is automatically generated in the background while he is
composing his message. Doing this, as opposed to generating the key pair as
Bob clicks “Send Encrypted”, is a short-lived keys usability suggestion made
by Brown et al. [12]. If Bob decides to cancel composing his message, the
newly generated short-lived key is immediately destroyed.
– Initial Receiver: As Alice for the first time opens a new encrypted thread started
by Bob, a new short-lived key is automatically generated in the background
and bound to that thread. Even if she doesn’t request access to the thread,
her newly generated key will exist until it is destroyed.
• Key Lifespan: Short-lived keys in this model have an initial lifespan of 30 days.
After this time period, users can choose to extend the lifespan of a key for 2 days.
As the key continues to expire, users can continue to extend its lifespan by 2 days if
they decide against destroying it.
• Key Coverage: One short-lived key pair protects all encrypted messages on one
email thread. If Alice has two encrypted threads open with Bob, both Alice and
Bob use 2 key pairs (4 key pairs total between the two of them) to communicate
with each other.
• Automation of Key Destruction: Key destruction in this prototype uses a combination of manual and partially automated key destruction features (see Chapter 3).
Users can choose to destroy their short-lived keys at any time, but are also reminded
to manage their keys through a popup once the keys have expired.
Unlike the long-terms keys prototype detailed in Section 4.5, this prototype requires
a full key exchange every time two users start a new encrypted thread. This requirement
is based on the short-lived key model characteristics presented above.
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This prototype uses a popup to remind users to manage expired short-lived keys.
Figure 4.10 shows an example of the popup that users encounter once one or more of
their keys expire. Users are forced to choose one of the two options for each thread listed
before the popup disappears. They cannot exit out of the popup by any means besides
managing each of the threads presented. This popup will only show up on Gmail windows
and will only appear when there exist keys that have expired, but have not been destroyed
or had their lifespan extended.

Figure 4.10: Users a reminded to manage their expired keys through a popup like this.
4.6.2

Prototype Setup

The setup for this prototype does not ask for a user’s email address, because a long-term
key pair is not generated during the setup phase. Instead, as seen in Section 4.6.1,
short-lived keys are generated automatically in the background as they are needed. This
on-the-fly key generation allows the prototype to work with multiple email accounts at
the same time.
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4.6.3

Making Encrypted Messages Inaccessible

With this prototype, users have multiple options in terms of making their encrypted
messages inaccessible. They can still delete their messages from their email inbox and
delete them forever as seen with the long-term keys prototype. However, taking this
approach will not destroy their keys. If a user deleted an encrypted message in this way,
the key pair protecting the message will still exist in local storage until it expires. At this
point, the prototype will prompt the user to pick between destroying or retaining the key.
Another option users have for making their encrypted messages inaccessible is
using this prototype’s “Make Unreadable” button (see Figure 4.11), which is available at
all times unless the messages are manually deleted. While this option does not delete the
messages themselves, it destroys the short-lived keys protecting the encrypted messages,
making it impossible to decrypt them. Users can create the same effect by using the “Make
Thread Unreadable” button that shows up for every thread listed on the expired messages
management popup. Once a short-lived key pair is destroyed, encrypted messages will be
overlayed to show they can no longer be accessed (see Figure 4.12).

Figure 4.11: Users can use the “Make Unreadable” button to revoke their access to read
their encrypted threads at any time.

Figure 4.12: After using the “Make Unreadable” button, messages on encrypted threads
are permanently unreadable.
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4.6.4

User Interface

To help users understand their messages can expire and to help them keep track of the
expiration state of their messages, red expiration countdown labels are provided next
to the green “Encrypted” labels. The text of the labels shows users the amount of
time left before their thread of encrypted messages expire. As time passes, these labels
automatically update. They are accurate down to a minute. As seen in Figures 4.15
and 4.16, expiration label text changes from a countdown to a description as the state of
the keys protecting the labeled thread change. If a short-lived key is expired, but not
destroyed, the text of the related label will display “Expired”. Likewise, if a short-lived
key has been destroyed, the text of the related label will read “Unreadable”.

Figure 4.13: Labels for encrypted threads that haven’t been opened at all will display
“Unopened”.

Figure 4.14: Labels for threads protected by an unexpired short-lived key show how long
until the thread expires.

Figure 4.15: Labels for threads protected by an expired short-lived key indicate the thread
has expired.

Figure 4.16: Labels for threads protected by a destroyed short-lived key show the thread
is unreadable.
Inline tutorials are also provided for this prototype. While the tutorial provided
for composing encrypted email remains the same as the one used in the long-term keys
prototype, the read tutorial is extended for this prototype. Read tutorial text boxes
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are provided to give users information about the read expiration labels and the “Make
Unreadable” button.

4.7

Design Iterations

As these prototypes were developed, simple design iterations were conducted. These design
iterations involved adding user interface elements and functionality to the prototypes,
then reviewing the additions between lab members and professors. Those reviewing the
additions to the prototypes did their best to put themselves in the shoes of potential
users. Suggestions on changes were taken from reviewers and applied to the prototypes
wherever possible. Feedback from two user study pilot studies also led to some minor
changes in the software.

4.8

Model Comparison

In this section, we compare the threat model of our short-lived keys model to the shortlived keys model introduced by Schneier and Hall [37]. Their model assumes a trusted
long-term key pair is established for each user that is used to sign short-lived keys. The
short-lived keys can then be uploaded to an untrusted server. One drawback of this model
is that it requires participants to securely establish their long-term public keys before
they can start using short-lived keys to communicate securely. An advantage of their
model is that it reduces the attack surface to the long-term key establishment process.
In contrast, our model depends on a trusted webmail provider to distribute the
short-lived keys, which are protected during transmission using DKIM. It has a simpler
startup process for new users. However, the trusted server presents a larger attack surface
for tampering with the short-lived keys by hackers or through government coercion.

42

Chapter 5
Research Methodology

To evaluate the usability of our secure email prototypes, we conducted an IRBapproved within-subjects user study. We recruited pairs of participants to test each
prototype together, a user study methodology that was first introduced by Ruoti et al. [31].
In prior studies using this methodology, participants report feeling more comfortable
working with a friend or family member in studies with this methodology, but this approach
also better simulates grassroots adoption scenarios of these prototypes because participants
are not corresponding with study coordinators they do not know. In studies using this
methodology, study coordinators have limited interactions with study participants; they
answer questions related only to the study procedures and purposely ignore those related
to using the prototypes.
To participate in this study, participants were required to have an active Gmail
account because the prototypes were designed for Gmail only. Further, each participant
was required bring a friend with a Gmail account. Each participant was compensated $15
USD. The user studies were approximately 50–60 minutes in duration.
To begin the study, participants were warned that the software being tested was
research software and should not be used outside of the user study, and should not be used
with legitimate sensitive information. Further, users were informed that they would be
given information about the role they would play throughout the course of the study and
were warned to use the provided fake sensitive information and not their own. Knowing
users may encounter times where they would need to wait for an email and to help them
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feel more comfortable and natural, they were informed they could use their phones or the
Internet during these down times. Finally, users were informed they could communicate
with each other the way they normally would while working through scenarios like the
ones they would encounter in the study. This statement was used to preemptively remove
any doubt users may have about whether they could contact their friend if they had
questions or needed help.
Our user study ran from June 28, 2017 to July 12, 2017. In total, 30 participant
pairs (60 total participants) engaged in our user study. Due to various technical difficulties
and other problems, we rejected the results from 6 participants pairs (12 participants) from
our data analysis. Details found in section 5.6 give more information on the reasons for
rejecting this data. In the rest of this thesis, any participants and data from participants
referred to are exclusively from the 24 accepted participant pairs (48 participants).

5.1

Participant Demographics

Participants for this user study were Gmail users recruited from the Brigham Young
University campus. Most participants were recruited through posters distributed across
the campus in order to attract a diverse set of participants. A small portion of the
participants were recruited through email. These participants had asked to be informed
about upcoming user studies after attempting to sign up for a fully-booked user study
our lab was running just prior to this study.
Table 5.1 contains participant demographic information for the participants of this
study. Most of the participants in this study were young (92% between the ages of 18
and 34 years old). There was almost an even split between male and female participants
(54% female, 46% male). Almost all the participants had at least some college education
(63% some college, 27% college or university degree, and 6% Post-Secondary Education).
A majority of the participants considered themselves to have an intermediate level of
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Gender

Age

Education

Computer Expertise

Total

%

Male
Female
Prefer not to answer

22
26
0

46%
54%
0%

18–24 years old
25–34 years old
35–44 years old
45–54 years old
55 years or older

33
11
1
2
1

69%
23%
2%
4%
2%

Some school
High school graduate
Some college
College or university degree
Post-secondary education
Prefer not to answer

0
2
30
13
3
0

0%
4%
63%
27%
6%
0%

Beginner
Intermediate
Advanced

8
32
8

16%
66%
16%

Table 5.1: Participant Demographics
computer expertise (66%), while fewer participants considered their computer expertise
at beginner (16%) and advanced (16%) levels.
Participants in this study came with a wide range of occupational/educational
backgrounds, including technical and non-technical fields. Thirty-six different occupations/majors were represented in this study, with almost all the represented occupations/majors having one or two participants, and only one occupation/major with four
participants. Appendix B.2 has an extended participant demographics table.

5.2

User Study Tasks

After signing consent forms and after hearing the warnings and reminders in the introduction to the study, the study participants were assigned roles as participant A or
participant B based on the flip of a coin. Once the study coordinators and participants
moved to their respective rooms, the study coordinators introduced the participants to
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our dual monitor setup. Coordinators instructed participants to use the left monitor for
the instructions and survey questions and to use the right monitor for study tasks such
as installing the extension and sending email.
For most of the study, a Qualtrics survey was used to guide participants through
their assigned roles and tasks in a hypothetical email scenario. These instructions and
scenarios were accompanied by data collection portions including Likert-scale questions,
free response questions, and demographic questions.
This study involved having participants complete three task-based scenarios for two
different secure emails prototypes: a long-term keys prototype (LTK) and a short-lived
keys prototype (SLK). Participants were asked to role-play the same scenarios and work
through the same tasks for each prototype. Each participant pair of the study tested the
prototypes in a randomized order to account for the effects of test-enhanced learning.
In many tasks, participants were given worksheets providing information helping
them complete their tasks. Some of these worksheets contained blank spaces allowing
users to fill in the sensitive information acquired during the task. While some of these
worksheets were still necessary, due to our dual monitor setup, we quickly realized it
was not necessary to provide worksheets with blank spaces for the sensitive information.
Instead of copying the sensitive information to the worksheet, participants usually just
copied the info from their open email on the right screen to the survey questions on the
left screen.
In all the following study tasks, participants role-played the passing of time in
the scenarios they were working through by flipping the pages of a desk calendar to the
appropriate date given in the scenario. Requiring the participants to physically change
the date on the desk calendars was done to create a break in the normal study flow
and emphasize the passing of time in the role-played scenarios. The following tasks and
scenarios are presented in the same order participants were asked to complete them in.
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5.2.1

Initial Scenario

In the initial scenario of the study, participant A and participant B are asked to play
different roles. Participant B plays the role of participant A’s friend who is an accountant
working on participant A’s taxes. In the scenario, participant B has requested participant
A’s social security number (SSN) and personally identifying number (PIN) from last
year’s taxes. Participant A is required to send the SSN and PIN to participant B securely
using encryption. Participant A is provided a URL they can follow to obtain the secure
email prototype for this purpose. Participant B is not informed that participant A is
required to encrypt the SSN and PIN.
The tasks for this scenario require:
1. Participant A to download and install the prototype using the site at the provided
URL.
2. Participant A to send the provided SSN and PIN in an encrypted email to participant
B.
3. Participant B to open the encrypted email and follow the instructions to install the
prototype.
4. Participant B to retrieve the encrypted SSN and PIN.
5. Participant B to send the provided tax confirmation code and tax confirmation PIN
in an encrypted email to participant B.
6. Participant A to open and retrieve the confirmation code and confirmation PIN.
7. Participant A to send a final message to participant B saying they received the
confirmation information. Study instructions did not require this final message to
be encrypted.
8. Participant B to open and read this final message.
9. Each participant to enter the sensitive information they received into their survey.
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After these tasks were completed, study coordinators took control of the study
computers for a short time to prepare for the next task. If participants were in the midst
of testing LTK the study coordinator would simply close the participant’s Gmail tab,
explaining that they were about to simulate the passing of 31 days and needed to close
the tab to help the participant simulate coming back to Gmail after that time period. On
the other hand, if the participant was in the midst of testing SLK, the study coordinator
would not only close the open Gmail tab, but would also use the options of the Chrome
extension to expire the short-lived keys of the prototype. This was done with the simple
click of one button on the extension’s options page. Participants witnessed these steps
taken by study coordinators.
5.2.2

Retrieval Scenario

Study instructions for this scenario continued the roles that participants were given in
the initial scenario. It begin with role-playing the passing of 31 days after the initial task
ended. This length of time was chosen because participants’ encrypted messages from
the initial tasks for SLK expired after 30 days. After role-playing this passage of time,
participants were given the scenario of needing to go back to their email to retrieve the
SSN and PIN (participant B) or the confirmation code and confirmation PIN (participant
A). Both participants were informed that they had disposed of hard copies they had of
this information because they thought they didn’t need it anymore. Further, in both
scenarios, the motivation for retrieving the information again was based on the United
States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) needing more information from each participant.
Participants were required to retrieve this information from their email accounts
and not to request it directly from the other participant again. The scenario ended with
participants entering the retrieved information into their surveys. If participants could not
retrieve the information, the study coordinator would provide the necessary information
so that the participant could continue the study.
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5.2.3

Removal Scenario

For this scenario, participants were informed that they were 100% certain they would
not need the information again. Considering this, they were tasked with doing what
they thought necessary to make the information inaccessible. No passing of time was
role-played for this scenario, as participants were instructed they wanted to remove emails
containing the sensitive information immediately after retrieving it.
5.2.4

Snooper Scenario

The final scenario began with participants role-playing the passage of one day since
they completed the removal scenario. At this point, participants role-played a scenario
where they left their computers and email open for several minutes and also lost sight of
their computers for several minutes. Each scenario involves a suspected snooper having
access to the participant’s computer. For example, participant A role-played leaving
their computer for several minutes to get some fresh air outside and saw their roommate
sneaking out of the participant’s room as the participant came back inside. Participant B
role-played leaving their cubicle to get a snack at a vending machine and coming back to
see their coworker casually walking out of their cubicle.
After reading these scenarios, participants were tasked with determining the
encrypted information the snooper could have seen if the snooper was on the participant’s
computer. For this task, participants were encouraged to look through their email inbox to
help determine what the snooper could have seen. This task ended with the participants
using the survey to answer the question, “Was your roommate[co-worker] able to read
any of your encrypted email?”.
5.2.5

Prototype Scoring and Free Response

Once the scenarios and related tasks were complete, participants were asked questions
related to the prototype they tested. First, they completed 10 Likert-scale questions
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regarding the usability of the prototype. Next, they were asked to give a free response
on what they liked about using the prototype. Finally, they answered a free response
question asking what they would change about the prototype.

5.3

Final Survey Questions

After participants completed all scenarios, tasks, and survey questions for both prototypes,
they were given a final set of survey questions. The first question from this set asked
participants to choose their favorite of the two prototypes, also allowing for participants
to say they didn’t like either of the prototypes. After this, they were asked to explain
why they chose the prototype they did. Finally, they were asked to give two Likert-scale
responses to the following prompts:
1. I want to be able to encrypt my email.
2. I would encrypt my email frequently.

5.4

Browser Cleanup

Between the final survey and the exit interview, the study coordinators wiped the Chrome
browser history for safety and consistency—to protect participant accounts and reset the
browser for the next test.

5.5

Exit Interview

At the end of the study, each coordinator conducted a 10–15 minute semi-structured
exit interview with the participant they monitored. The interview questions, enumerated
in Appendix B.1.9, first explored the participant’s experience with the study and the
prototypes. Some questions encouraged the participants to make comparisons between
the two prototypes, while other questions focused on ideas related to short-lived keys and
message/information permanence. Participants were also asked if they would like to use
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either of the two prototypes in the future. If enough time was left, study coordinators
asked participants questions related to SLK’s user interface elements and other design
choices. Study coordinators consistently asked the participants for more details if their
answers were unclear or did not contain enough explanation.

5.6

Quality Control

A total of 6 participant pairs were removed from the results of this study. Even though
problems generally only occurred for one participant during these studies, data from both
participants was removed. Technical issues with the prototypes ruled out 4 participant
pairs. For two of those pairs, one of the prototypes they were testing became completely
inoperable for unclear reasons during the first exchange of sensitive information participants
attempted. These technical failures could not be resolved by trying the task again from
scratch or through study coordinator debugging efforts. With two other participant
pairs, technical failures prevented SLK user interface elements from appearing on screen.
This restricted some of the participants’ ability to complete tasks and make reasonable
comparisons between the two prototypes tested.
The data from another participant pair was thrown out because it was discovered
that one of the participants from this pair was 17 years old, whereas we only intended
to recruit those 18 years old and older. Another pair’s data was removed from the
results of this study because mistakes made by the study coordinators affected the
participant’s ability to complete some of the tasks. Any participants sent away early were
still compensated $15 USD for their time.

5.7

Study Machines and Key Generation

Efficient key generation time is especially important in SLK, because the keys are generated
close to the time they are needed for the key exchange. Key generation times are likely to
differ based on hardware configuration. The hardware configuration shown below was used
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for both of our user study machines that participants used. This hardware configuration
generates keys without noticeable delays (generation time < 1 second) in both prototypes.
• CPU: AMD Ryzen 7 1700 (8 cores, 16 threads, 3.0 GHz)
• RAM: 16 GB DDR4
• Graphics: NVIDIA GEFORCE GTX 1050 Ti
• Disk: Samsung 960 EVO M.2 NVMe SSD

5.8

User Study Pilot

We conducted two pilot studies using pairs of participants from our lab. Feedback from
these pilot studies were used to further refine the prototypes, as well as our user study
design. These pilot studies also helped to train study coordinators for the upcoming
study.

5.9

Limitations

As stated above, this study involved role-playing the passage of time in several instances.
Although we took steps necessary to help participants better internalize the simulation of
time passing, the scenarios and tasks in this study would be more realistically contextualized in a longitudinal study. A longitudinal study would not only allow short-lived keys
to expire naturally, but it would also allow participants to more naturally experience how
the prototypes integrate with their email accounts over time.
Requiring users to send, receive, and manage encrypted emails with only one other
person is another limitation of this methodology. Using these prototypes to securely
communicate with more than one other person is likely to be more complicated and
may introduce more usability complexities, as well as more opportunities for users to
make mistakes. In the end, we choose to create tasks and scenarios around securely
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communicating with only one person, because it allowed us to focus on the basic usability
of the prototypes and the general participant interest in these prototypes.
Our study also has limitations common to all existing secure email studies. First,
our population is not representative of all groups, and future research could broaden the
population (e.g., non-students, non-Gmail users). Second, our study is a lab study and
has limitations common to all studies run in a trusted environment [23, 31, 39].
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Chapter 6
Quantitative Results

This chapter reports the quantitative results from our user study. We first present
the SUS scores participants gave for each prototype. SUS results are followed by an
analysis of the data showing differences based on the order the prototypes were tested.
Following that, quantitative data for participants’ favorite prototypes and the mistakes
participants made are presented. This chapter ends with a discussion on the limitations
of our quantitative results. We will refer to the long-term keys prototype as LTK and the
short-lived keys prototype as SLK.
The data for this study can be downloaded at isrl.byu.edu.

6.1

System Usability Scale

The System Usability Scale (SUS) is a standard usability metric. It is based on ten
usability Likert-scale questions and a method for computing a single score between 0
and 100. The questions and methodology for calculating SUS scores can be found in
Appendix B.3. SUS has an established track record in the usability community and there
is evidence that it is reliable across different sets of participants [29]. It has been used in
hundreds of usability studies [5] and the original SUS paper [10] has been cited over 4,900
times as of August 2017. After comparing SUS to four other usability metrics, Tullis and
Stetson determined SUS gives the most reliable results [42].
Work done by several researchers helps give greater context to SUS scores. Bangor
et al. [5] analyzed 2,324 SUS surveys, and derived a set of acceptability ranges that
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describe whether a system with a given score is acceptable to users in terms of usability.
Bangor et al. [5] also associated specific SUS scores with adjective descriptions of the
system’s usability. Sauro et al. [36] also analyzed SUS scores from Bangor et al. [4], Tullis
et al. [42], and their own data. They calculated the percentile values for SUS scores and
assigned letter grades based on percentile ranges. The contextual clues are shown in
Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1: Adjective-based ratings and percentiles to help interpret SUS scores. SUS
scores are given across the bottom of the figure. Bangor et al. [5] developed the acceptability
ranges seen on the bottom bar, as well as the adjectives (OK, Good, etc.) on the middle
bar. Sauro et al. [36] developed the letter grades seen on the top bar and the percentile
ranges seen across the top of the figure.
The System Usability Scale was used to evaluate the usability of the two prototypes.
A breakdown of the scores given to each prototype can be seen in Table 6.1. Overall,
SLK received a mean SUS score of 73.3, while LTK received a mean SUS score of 66.8.
According to the contextual scales, both prototypes are rated as having “Good” usability.
While the difference in SLK’s SUS score and LTK’s SUS score is statistically significant
(two tailed student t-test, equal variance, p < 0.005), we argue that this is not a strong
indication of SLK being more usable than LTK. Limitations introduced in Section 6.2
and further discussed in Section 6.5 provide supporting results and possible explanations
for this argument.
Ruoti et al. [31] introduced paired participant studies, but never explored whether
the participants playing different roles in the study were having different experiences
with the tools, showing the experience of different participant roles contributes research
value. To confirm we gained real research value from our paired-participant study, we
calculated the correlation between the SUS scores participants gave for each prototype
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Standard
Deviation

Min

66.5
67.2
66.8

19.9
16.0
17.9

22.5
27.5
22.5

56.9 68.8 80
65 70.0 77.5
61.3 70.0 77.5

100
92.5
100

SLK
SLK
SLK

A
B
Both

24
24
48

72.3
74.4
73.3

15.3
7.8
12.1

32.5
45.0
32.5

65 72.5 82.5
72.5 75.0 77.5
70.0 75.0 78.1

95.0
90.0.
95.0

Q3

Max

Mean

24
24
48

Median

Count

A
B
Both

Q1

Participant
LTK
LTK
LTK

Table 6.1: SUS Scores
against the SUS scores participant B gave for each prototype. Figure 6.2 displays the two
linear regressions for the scores of both participants based on prototype. There was little
correlation with these scores (Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients 1 : LTK —
0.188, SLK — -0.119), suggesting that participants playing role A are having different
experiences testing the usability of these prototypes than the participants playing role B
are. Participants having different experiences with the prototypes during the study is
evidence that we gained real value from using pairs of participants in our study.
1

The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (bivariate correlation) measures linear correlation
between two variables. The coefficient values range between -1 and +1. A coefficient of 0 represents no
correlation, while coefficient values of -1 and +1 represent total negative and total positive correlation
respectively.
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Figure 6.2: Linear regressions for the correlation of scores between participants for
prototypes.
While there was little correlation between participants A and B in terms of SUS
score, there was a moderate correlation between how participants each rated LTK and
SLK (Perason product-moment correlation coefficient — 0.624). Figure 6.3 displays two
linear regressions for these scores (the second is the inverse of the first). The moderate
correlation between these scores suggests that participants were fairly consistent in their
ratings of the two prototypes. So, if participants gave a high score to the first prototype
they tested, they fairly consistently gave the second prototype they tested a high score as
well.

6.2

Differences Based on Test Ordering

We analyzed our SUS data to determine if the test order of our prototypes affected the
scores participants gave them. The mean SUS scores for each prototype based on their
test order are provided in Table 6.2. These mean values show interesting differences
between the mean scores of the prototypes based on their test order. For example, LTK
has a statistically significantly higher SUS score when it is tested first as compared to
its SUS score when it is tested second (two tailed student t-test, equal variance, p <
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Figure 6.3: Linear regressions for the correlation of scores between prototypes given by
participants.

SUS Mean

LTK First

LTK Second

SLK First

SLK Second

74.06

59.58

70.31

76.35

Table 6.2: Mean SUS scores for prototypes based on their test order.
0.05). On the other hand, even though SLK has a higher mean SUS score when it is
tested second, the difference is not statistically significant (two tailed student t-test, equal
variance, p = 0.065).
There are several possible explanations for the statistically significant difference in
SUS scores for LTK. First, given that users were asked to make their encrypted messages
inaccessible, participant’s usability scores for LTK may be affected by the participant’s
exposure, or lack of exposure, to other methods of making their messages inaccessible.
For example, when LTK was tested second, participants had already been exposed to
SLK’s “Make Unreadable” functionality. Having an obvious, easy-to-use option for
making messages inaccessible in the first prototype and having no “Make Unreadable”
functionality in the second prototype is likely to have been a sharp contrast in usability
from the perspective of the participants that tested the prototypes in this order. Shedding
more light on this, we observed several participants give up on making their messages
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LTK
SLK
Disliked Both

Participant A

Participant B

Total

6 (25%)
17 (71%)

6 (25%)
18 (75%)

12 (25%)
35 (73%)

1 (4%)

0 (0%)

1 (2%)

Table 6.3: Participants’ favorite prototypes.
inaccessible (meaning they took no action at all) when they tested LTK second. In
contrast to this, all but one of the participants that tested LTK first took some kind of
action to delete their encrypted messages.

6.3

Favorite Prototype

After completing all tasks for both prototypes, participants were asked to choose which
of the two prototypes was their favorite. The results are summarized in Table 6.3. SLK
received more support from participants with 35 (73%) participants choosing it as their
favorite. LTK received 12 (25%) favorite prototype votes and one participant indicated
they didn’t like either of the prototypes.
Interestingly, we see very little difference in the number of A and B participants
that chose LTK or SLK as their favorite prototype. At first, this seems to suggest
that although participants A and B are having different usability experiences with the
prototypes (see Section 6.1), pairs of participants are coming to similar conclusions about
their favorite prototypes. However, only 15 out of the 24 participant pairs (63%) agreed
on their favorite prototypes. This may be even more evidence that participants A and B
are having different experiences and that paired-participant studies are providing real
research value.
The proportion of participants that chose SLK as their favorite prototype was
statistically significant (Test for one proportion, null hypothesis 50%, observed proportion
74.46%, population 47, p < 0.001). We are 95% confident the proportion of users from
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the represented population that will choose SLK as their favorite prototype lies between
59% and 84% (“exact” Clopper-Pearson confidence interval).
While these data points show most of our participants chose SLK as their favorite
prototype, this data does not explain why these participants chose SLK as their favorite.
Participants may have chosen SLK as their favorite prototype for a variety of reasons.
This problem is further explored in the Limitations section (Section 6.5).

6.4

Mistakes

After reviewing the results of the study, we defined two mistakes participants could make
as they worked through their study tasks:
1. Failure to Make Messages Inaccessible: Participants could make this mistake
by not taking the necessary actions to make all their sensitive encrypted information
inaccessible. For example, this mistake can be made by deleting sensitive information,
but not deleting it from Gmail’s trash. Further, this mistake can be made by not
fully deleting every message on an encrypted thread. Each participant has the
chance to make 2 mistakes for this category, one for each prototype.
2. Incorrect Snooper Question Answer: After participants were asked to make
their sensitive encrypted messages inaccessible, they were given a scenario where they
suspected someone snooping on their computer. They were tasked with determining
if the snooper could have seen any of their encrypted email. It was counted a
mistake if participants answered this question incorrectly. For example, answering
that the snooper could not see any encrypted messages, even though at least one
of the encrypted messages wasn’t deleted, is counted as a mistake. We counted
answers of “I’m not sure” as a mistake, because participants should have no doubt
whether or not their sensitive information is inaccessible. Each user has the chance
to make 2 mistakes for this category, one for each prototype.
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Participant A
Participant B

LTK
SLK
LTK
SLK
Totals

Mistakes
Making
Answering
Messages
Snooper
Inaccessible
Question
11
5
2
1
9
6
3
3
25
15

Table 6.4: A summary of mistakes made by participants in our user study.
The mistakes made by participants in our user study are summarized in Table 6.4.
Participants made more mistakes using LTK than SLK. Further, more mistakes were
made while users were making their messages inaccessible compared to the number of
mistakes made while answering the snooper question. This may suggest that while
many participants couldn’t successfully make their messages inaccessible, given a snooper
scenario, a majority of them were still able to successfully identify when their messages
were still accessible. Encountering the snooper scenario may have made participants work
harder to determine if their messages were actually inaccessible. The limitations of these
quantitative results are also further discussed in Section 6.5.

6.5

Limitations

Even though SLK was given a higher SUS score, was chosen as a favorite prototype more
than LTK, and experienced less mistakes by participants, our study was conducted in such
a way that the quantitative data cannot inform us on what factors led to these results.
Asking users to make their messages inaccessible may have given an unfair advantage to
SLK, because SLK had functionality directly related to this task, while LTK required
users to figure out how to do this without any help from the prototype. Further, the
quantitative data collected in this study does not help us understand whether users liked
SLK’s short-lived keys more than LTK’s long-term keys. Participants may have chosen
SLK as their favorite and may have given SLK higher SUS scores based on either, or a
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combination of these factors. While quantitative data cannot shed light on these issues,
an analysis of our qualitative data provides more clarity.

62

Chapter 7
Qualitative Results

In this chapter, we present a discussion of our two secure email prototypes based on
an analysis of the qualitative data from the study. Qualitative data was gathered through
free response questions in the study survey, as well as a 10–15 minute exit interview
conducted for each participant. The questions participants were asked in the survey and
the interview are available in Appendix B. In the interviews, participants referred to the
LTK prototype as prototype A, or just A. Similarly, participants referred to the SLK
prototype as prototype B, or just B.
Given that we used a semi-structured interview approach for the exit interviews
and because some interviews were shorter than others, not every interview question was
asked to every participant. Due to this, we simply report the number of participants that
expressed specific points without giving the proportion of participants that expressed
specific points. Further, some participants expressed conflicting ideas. For example, when
asked which prototype was more secure, one participant (P8A) stated they felt LTK was
more secure, but also said they felt both prototypes were equally secure.

7.1

Interview Coding Methodology

We analyzed the qualitative data from the exit interviews through a simple coding process.
Out of our 48 participants, audio for 47 exit interviews was available for transcription and
analysis. Audio for one of the interviews was not captured because the audio recorder’s
batteries died before the interview started. In this case, the study coordinator took
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notes throughout the interview. We used these notes during the coding process for this
participant’s data.
For convenience and searchability, the interviews were first transcribed. After
transcription, two researchers worked together to code the interviews at the same time.
The two coders listened to the exit interview audio, following along with the dialogue on
the related transcript. As they listened, the coders jointly extracted and recorded codes
and interesting participant quotes. If ever the coders disagreed on a code, they would
discuss the disagreement, referring to the transcription and audio until they agreed.

7.2

Security and Trust

During the exit interview, participants were asked which of the two prototypes they
felt was more secure and which of the two prototypes they trusted more. Overall, 37
participants indicated they felt SLK was more secure, 3 felt LTK was more secure, and 8
felt that both prototypes were secure in general. Of those that felt SLK was more secure,
26 participants expressed that the functionality of the “Make Unreadable” button made
SLK feel more secure. Also, 15 participants commented that the expiration of messages
in SLK also made SLK feel more secure. Commenting on the reasons they felt SLK was
more secure, P19B and P23B respectively said:
“By hitting that button to make it unreadable, to me gave me more confidence
that even though the message was still in the trash, the information within the
message was... gone.”
“I liked the extra buttons on it. That I could see where to make it secure so
nobody else could read. So in the scenario, somebody going into my cubicle, I
could say with confidence I had secured it. I knew it was. On the second one
(tool A), I couldn’t remember how to secure it.”
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Code
SLK more secure
“Make Unreadable” button made SLK more secure
Expiration made SLK more secure
Both prototypes secure in general
LTK more secure
It was more developed or had more options
I felt more comfortable with the prototype
It was more clear
Access requests made it feel more secure (key exchange)

#
37
26
15
8
3
3
2
2
1

Table 7.1: Codes related to the security of the prototypes.
The responses participants gave for saying one prototype was more secure than
the other are summarized in the codes seen in Table 7.1.
When asked about which prototype they trusted more, participants generally
responded in similar ways as they did when asked about security. Overall, 34 participants
trusted SLK more, 5 trusted prototype A more, and 7 trusted both about the same.
Participants expressed that they trusted SLK more because of its make unreadable
functionality (16) and because of its expiration functionality (10). Interestingly, two
participants expressed they trusted prototype A over SLK, because they did not understand
SLK’s “Make Unreadable” button. On this subject, P2A and P22A respectively said:
“I guess the wording on the button, it also makes me concerned about other
buttons and I could be misinterpreting those maybe.”
“I think I trust A more, just because with that make unreadable, I didn’t
understand what I had done. So, if I were like in this situation where I couldn’t
even access it anymore and he also like revoked his access too... We’re done...
It’s done... There’s nothing we can do. So, I think I trust A more, just because
I myself am clumsy, or like... I didn’t process or didn’t understand this would
make it unreadable to me too.”
Participants P17B and P22B both expressed trusting SLK more than LTK. When
asked about why they felt this way, they respectively responded, saying:
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Code
Trust SLK more
Trust SLK because of “Make Unreadable” button
Trust SLK because of expiration
Trust both prototypes in general
Trust LTK more
It gave me more control
It felt more secure
More choices provide more safety
Did not understand “Make Unreadable” button

#
34
16
10
7
5
5
3
2
2

Table 7.2: Codes related the degree of trust in the prototypes.
“I feel like being confident in how to use the software makes me more confident
that it works. I know that’s a logical fallacy, but, I do admit that being able to
know how to use it makes me again more confident that it’s effective in what
it’s supposed to do.”
“I guess B just because I liked how B really like... thought about what the user
wants. I mean you know, I think it’s cool that B allows you to, like it does it
for you in the sense that after 30 days it’s expired. However, if you want to
keep it, the messages, then you can, you know, keep the thread and then after
that make it unreadable if you don’t need it again. So, I think B... gave you
more options and so it seemed more...”
The responses participants gave for saying they trusted one prototype over another
are summarized in the codes seen in Table 7.2.

7.3

SLK Features

Participants were asked several questions about SLK’s features throughout the course of
the exit interview. These questions focused on user interface elements, functionality, and
key management approaches for SLK. The qualitative feedback participants gave after
being asked these questions are summarized in this section.
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7.3.1

Expiration Timing

We asked participants if they thought SLK’s default expiration lifespan of 30 days was a
good default value for expiration timing. A little over half of the participants (26) indicated
that a month is good for expiration timing in general. However, some participants, even
those that thought one month was good, expressed a need for making the expiration time
shorter or longer. More participants suggested making the expiration time shorter (20)
compared to the number of participants that indicated they wanted it to be longer (5).
Four participants expressed the expiration timing for secure emails should only be long
enough to let you save or write the sensitive information somewhere else. Thirty-one
participants indicated the expiration timing of some secure emails depends on context.
For example, participants explained expiration time should be dependent not only on
what sensitive information is being sent, but should also be based on who you are sending
the information to.
Most participants mentioned a desire to override the default expiration time before
being asked. Overall, 45 participants expressed interest in having control over expiration
timing for their secure emails. On this subject, P17B and P22A respectively stated:
“Personally, I would like to be able to set it every time. Yeah, it’s an extra
step, but it’s something that I think is important enough that I would like to
be able to say, okay I want to keep this information for three days. After three
days I’m not going to really need it anymore... Or, I’d like to be able to keep
it for 30 days. And I feel like there should even maybe be a cap maybe like
no longer than 3 months... After 3 months then you should just request the
information again.”
“I think it would be really cool though if you could customize the amount of
days you would want it to be set. That would be really cool, cuz that way
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like the sender can make sure that, okay you can only have access to this
information in this span of time, because this work needs to be done.”
Even though many participants expressed a desire to control the expiration time,
fifteen participants expressed a desire for a default setting so they would not have to set
an expiration time for every secure email they send. For example, P10B said:
“I think it’s nice to have a default. But then if I have something that I want
to last like shorter or longer, it would be nice to be able to like have some sort
of capability to go in the settings.”
This feedback indicates that a short-lived keys tool should support a default
expiration time, but should also give users the option to revise the expiration timing on
a per-message basis. Since the results on an appropriate default time are mixed, users
could select the default time during the setup phase of the tool.
7.3.2

Expiration Labels

Participants were also asked what they thought about the red expiration labels shown
next to inbox and thread secure email headers in SLK. In response to this question, 22
participants expressed that these labels stood out, 11 said they were helpful, and 4 stated
the labels were easy to understand. Expressing these ideas, P3A and P19B respectively
stated:
“It was very easy to see, very easy to notice. I didn’t have to rummage around
to find that it had that function, that feature. Like I understood what it meant
as soon as I saw it.”
“I think they’re helpful. I mean that was the first thing that kind of drew
[me in] when I started the second one [SLK] was the fact that it looked like
it expired and I thought that was kinda cool as opposed to the first one that
didn’t have that.”
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Thirteen participants explained that these labels are good because they provide
good reminders to users and help prevent users from being surprised or frustrated when
secure messages become unreadable. For example, P10B said:
“It’s a nice reminder, like, ‘Oh yeah, this expires in this many hours or days.’
So, it’s like a nice reminder to, ‘Kay, look, have I done everything I need with
the information?’ Can I actually like delete it delete it?”
Participants were also asked if they thought these kinds indicators should exist in
any tool that expires messages. Out of the participants that were asked this question, 21
stated these kinds of indicators should exist in tools that expire messages.
While many participants expressed support for these labels, some did not. Some
participants were indifferent to the labels and others expressed negative sentiments about
them. Expressing concerns about labels showing attackers exactly where to look for
sensitive information, P6A stated:
“I also think if someone new was to jump onto my computer and think, ‘What’s
sensitive here?’ That’s exactly where their eyes would go to.”
Other opinions on the expiration labels include: one participant stating the red on
these labels was scary, two participants explaining the labels were annoying/nagging, and
another participant saying the red on the labels was distracting.
7.3.3

Automation and Making Messages Unreadable

As a reminder, SLK does not automatically make secure emails unreadable. Users of SLK
have the option to manually make messages unreadable whenever they want using the
“Make Unreadable” button. Or, they can wait until the email expires and manage the
expired email through a popup that gives them the choice of retaining the email or making
it unreadable. When asked about the way the prototype handled expired encrypted emails
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in general, 27 participants indicated they liked the approach. Even though this approach
received positive feedback, participants had other ideas on how this could be handled.
For example, 10 participants indicated they would like to have messages automatically
become unreadable after they have expired. Supporting this approach, P10A and P11A
stated:
“You could also have it like... Have it preset to expire at that time... So you
don’t have to say keep or delete it. It just deletes it if you already say at that
time that you can delete.”
“I think that gives you fair warning and so I think it’s pointless almost if it
doesn’t do it itself after that period of time.”
On the other hand, 11 participants voiced their opinions on how messages should
not automatically become unreadable after they have expired. For example, P17B and
P22B said:
“I think, I like the idea of being able to see the message before it gets deleted
forever... That way I can know what’s disappearing. You know? Just as it’s
important for me to see what is coming in to my email, I like to see what is
leaving my email... That way I don’t have any errors come up, like oh man,
I lost that email. I still needed it for another day and a half or whatever...
Having a warning is nice.”
“No, I like that it, you know, allows you to keep it a little longer. I mean you
know in this busy life sometimes we might forget, or you know, that little mini
heart attack where you think oh shoot it’s deleted after 30 days but like now it
gives you that option to revive it I suppose...”
As two participants were thinking about the trade–offs between our implementation
and making messages unreadable automatically, they came up with another solution: to
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warn users before messages expire, but automatically make them unreadable once they
do expire. This is best expressed in the words of P24B:
“I think that would be useful on the one hand because... I tend to let my email
inbox pile up I don’t keep it cleaned out and permanently delete things... But
on the other hand, I would like the option... I would like to have a message
popup that says, this message is due to become unreadable in the next 24 hours
if you want to save it do this. If you don’t care click here, kind of a thing.”
Interestingly, 9 participants indicated they want SLK to allow them to re-request
access to information once it is made unreadable. Essentially, they believed their friend
could send them some kind of access code to let them into the information again after
having revoked their own access. While this doesn’t make much sense in terms of shortlived keys, it is important to know that some users have this expectation of a tool that
makes messages inaccessible after a period of time. On the other hand, this may only be
a critique applicable to our prototype, because we combined short-lived keys with our
email-based key exchange that was disguised as an access request.
7.3.4

Message Management Popup

When asked if they liked the popup asking them to manage expired messages, most
participants answered in the affirmative. Overall, 32 participants said they liked it,
while 2 participants said they didn’t. In general, users liked the popup because it was a
good reminder to them to manage their messages and because it gave them options for
managing their expired messages. Seven participants gave feedback saying the popup was
helpful. Participants supporting the use of the popup included P21A and P22B. They
respectively stated:
“I think that popup was necessary. It was good. I liked the choice.”
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“No, I liked that. I like it to be right in my face. Not just like, you know, a
little sign on the title of the message but like right in my face, that way I know
like when I missed a day.”
Two of the participants who did not like the popup said it was, or would become,
too annoying. For example, P24A said:
“I found it a little aggravating... When it’s important to me, I’m generally
pretty good about managing what I need to and taking care of my stuff... Having
stuff coming up to me and saying, ‘Hey, take care of me! Hey, look at me!’
kind of stresses me out.”
Even two participants who said they liked the popup were also worried about it
becoming annoying. In line with this, P3B, who initially expressed support for the popup,
said:
“If it was like every time that would be dumb.”
This comment helps show the limitations of the results of this user study in terms
of the message management popup. Even though many participants liked the popup after
limited exposure to it, it may be that a majority of them would begin to dislike it after
encountering it more frequently or over a longer period of time.
7.3.5

Protection and Expiration Bundling

One of the final interview questions asked for feedback about the way SLK encrypted
and expired messages on the thread level. Participants were asked if they would prefer
expiration and protection to work on the thread level, or if they would prefer it to work
another way. Generally, if participants could think of no other way for this to work on
their own, the study coordinators would give them ideas, such as single email messages
expiring by themselves.
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In response to this question, 24 participants indicated they liked the idea of
bundling expirable encrypted messages at the thread level. Seven of these explained that
this is a good idea because threads are generally about one thing and if any of it should go,
it should all go. Further, some participants supported the concept of bundling expiration
and protection at the thread level because it would be convenient to do so. In support of
thread bundling, P17B stated:
“My gut reaction is yes, I love having it for the whole thread... That way, in
the event of somebody looking into the information, they have no idea what
was exchanged. They have no idea. Maybe they can guess from the subject
lines what the nature of the correspondence was, but other than that, I like the
idea of... not having access to anything... Because at the end of the day, like,
if you’re getting rid of the most important piece of information, why not get
rid of the entire thread... Just cause you don’t need the less important stuff if
you don’t need the more important stuff.”
After considering other options for message bundling, 17 participants expressed
a desire for an option allowing messages to be protected and expire by themselves.
Interestingly, 9 of those participants also expressed interest in thread bundling. P18B
made the following statements expressing the desire for this option:
“I personally like it all handled inside the thread but I can see some cases
where you’d want to... to delete one email instead of the entire thread.”
Several participants thought hard about the trade–offs between approaches to
message bundling, thinking out loud about some of the benefits and problems they would
encounter with them. This is best expressed through P23B’s comments as they worked
through the problem out loud:
“I have to say it depends on the email. If I have to do one or the other, I’d
probably say all of them at once... Part of me sits down and says in this thread
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I was doing all the emails at once so it’s all at one time and it’s all over one
day, but sometimes, and this goes back to my study for my doctorate, that
emails come over two or three day. That we’re talking back and forth and I
have to wait 6, 8 hours to get a response back from you, back and forth. In
which case, then no, maybe it would be better to just go by thread by thread...
It would depend on the length of time from the start to the end of the thread.
So like if it’s a few hours, then yeah all of it together. But if it’s a thread
that’s being spread out over several days, or several weeks, then I may not
necessarily want it to. But if I had to choose one, then I would choose all or
nothing, not each one. Because I would find each one, having to got through
each one being annoying. Or the best again is a toggle that says the control of
I want to, do you want to do all of them or do you want to do them one at a
time and give me the choice of which one I want to go for.”

7.4

Information Permanence

Study coordinators asked participants four questions related to the permanence of their
information on their devices and in the Internet. Summaries of the feedback given in
response to these questions are provided in the following four sections.
7.4.1

Participant Email Persistence

When study coordinators asked participants how long their emails exist in their email
inboxes, most participants indicated that they keep their emails indefinitely or for a long
time. Fourteen participants indicated that their emails exist in their inbox forever, 14
stated their emails exist forever unless they delete them, 7 participants mentioned that
they never or only rarely delete their emails, and 18 participants gave a more general
answer of “a long time”. In terms of emails existing in their inboxes for long periods of
time, P21A and P10B said:
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“It’s an embarrassingly long amount of time. Indefinitely.”
“They last a long time actually. Like, if I don’t go put them in the trash and
then delete things forever from the trash... I was looking for something last
night actually because I couldn’t remember the emails I was looking for. It
pulled up search results from like 2015. I was like, ‘Oh! I still have those.’
So... Yeah, unless I go in and delete them then they just stay for a while.”
Only 6 participants said their emails don’t last in their inboxes for a very long
time. One of those participants, P4B, said:
“Usually like 2 weeks. I delete my emails pretty quickly. I try to keep my
inbox pretty empty. Like less than 50 on the front page.”
One participant (P17B) expressed concern about their emails actually being
completely deleted after deleting them from Gmail’s trash folder when they said:
“I admit I don’t know exactly what happens to that data after I delete it from
the trash can. I imagine it is still accessible on some level... But these days,
if I don’t need an email, I get rid of it completely... Again, mostly to save
space.”
Finally, 14 participants indicated that how long their emails last in their inboxes
depends on the email. For example, P20B stated:
“It depends. If it’s more academic work, business related, I will keep that for
longer. But if it’s school related I probably delete every semester. If it’s an
advertisement I delete it right away.”
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7.4.2

Worry About Message Permanence

When participants were asked about how much they worry about the permanence of their
messages on any of their devices, most participants expressed having little to no worry.
Specifically, 33 participants said they were “not too worried”, while 11 were somewhat
worried, and only 3 were “pretty worried”. Out of the participants that were “not too
worried”, or only somewhat worried, 10 indicated they felt this way because they don’t
have sensitive emails. The outlook of many of the participants that weren’t too worried
about the permanence of their messages on their devices are reflected in the words of
P15A and P4B, shown in that order below:
“I don’t really have very many important things in my email boxes, just, I’m
not really very old. So, I don’t really have to do many important things. My
main issue is they just take up lots of space and it’s just I have to go in and
manually delete them to clear up space on my computer—so that’s annoying.”
“I don’t know, I don’t feel that worried about it. I don’t really have a lot of
incriminating things on my phone or on my laptop. I’m a pretty open person,
so it doesn’t really matter to me a whole bunch. But, I can see how it would
be very important in a professional situation.”
In response to this question about their message permanence, 6 participants
answered saying that permanence can be good thing. However, participants differentiated
between permanence being good for regular messages and permanence being bad for
messages containing sensitive information. This feedback further confirms results from
work by Odom et al. [26], Jacek Gwizda [19], and Waugh et al. [45]. Qualitative data
gathered from participants in work by Odom et al. [26] indicates that Internet users regard
information permanence as important in many ways, including the data safety that comes
with backing up pictures and important documents. Odom et al.’s work also indicates
Internet users want to be able to delete their messages and information, something that
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is shown in the results of this study and work by Jacek Gwizda [19]. Some of these
sentiments were expressed as P17B stated:
“So, permanence is nice for general day to day stuff... I don’t have too
much sensitive information going over the Internet, so it’s nice that I have a
record... I used a messaging app for two years and it was nice to be able to
scroll way back to the beginning and see messages from two years ago. But,
I wasn’t dealing with sensitive information. There is, again, like I described
this uneasiness about the permanence of more sensitive information, just the
longer something stays on the Internet, the more likely it is that somebody is
going to stumble across it.”
While expressing that they were not worried about their message permanence,
several participants expressed that they probably should be more worried. On this vein
of thought, P13B said:
“Generally I’m not sending too many personal things, sensitive information,
pretty confident people can’t see it, but I think I probably should be...”
One participant (P22A), explained that they worried about the permanence of
their information to different degrees for different devices. They said:
“Maybe this is ignorance on my part, but I’m not that worried about my phone,
just because I don’t feel that phone hackings are really common. And I could be
wrong on that, maybe because it hasn’t happened to me... As far as laptops...
Laptops and computers I do get a little worried, just because I’ve had my laptop
stolen before with sensitive information on it. So... That’s a real big like, ‘Oh
shoot like now I have to like clean everything before they can figure out the
password to that laptop’... Then what was hard though on that was that I did
have actual tax information on that laptop saved... I don’t think whoever stole
it got into it though because nothing ever happened.”
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Representing those who are “pretty worried” about the permanence of their
messages on their devices, P23A simply stated:
“Quite worried... Cuz email’s easily hacked no matter [how] secure they say it
is.”
Interestingly, while answering this question, several participants expressed concerns
that once you delete your messages, they may still exist in some form on the Internet or
your devices. For example, P23A and P20A respectively stated:
“Well I know you can delete them and they’re still there anyways, they still
can be retrieved.”
“I’m actually kind of nervous about old things that I have on my phone.
Whether it’s emails or like information I’ve downloaded. There’s just so much
information that I forget where I’ve subscribed and what kind of information
I’ve given out so...even if I delete it or unsubscribe, it could still be on there.
So, that makes me a little nervous, but I don’t know how to fix it.”
Participants provided numerous other explanations for their level of concern about
the permanence of their messages. The codes for this subject are summarized in Table 7.3.
Overall, participants seem to express little concern about the permanence of their
messages on their various devices. There are several reasons that were given. First,
many participants care little about the permanence of their day-to-day messages, but do
what they deem necessary to manage their sensitive messages. They either delete the
messages or don’t send them at all. On the other hand, participants aren’t worried about
the permanence of their messages, because they haven’t been attacked and assume that
entities like the government already have their information anyways. Other participants
express little worry because they can’t control what other people and devices do with
their messages.
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Code
Not too worried
Somewhat worried
I can delete things already
Permanence is a good thing
Pass codes on phone and email accounts keep them secure
Pretty worried
I can’t control what other people do with my information
I don’t do secretive or illegal things
I delete things when I run out of space
Worried that someone else can access my emails
Avoid creating accounts where unnecessary
Nothing has happened to me yet
I know someone who is concerned
I should probably be more worried
The Government already knows my information
I don’t really think about it
“How many people can see this?”
I delete when I run out of space
It’s important to keep other people’s information safe

#
33
11
6
6
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1

Table 7.3: Codes for message permanence concerns.
Not Too
Worried
10

A Little
Bit Worried
12

Medium
Worry
1

Fairly
Worried
3

Really
Worried
8

Table 7.4: A summary of responses on how worried participants are on the permanence
of their information on the Internet in general.
7.4.3

Worry About General Information Permanence on the Internet

When users responded to questions asking about how worried they are about the permanence of their information on the Internet, they defined more levels of worry than they
did while talking about the permanence of their messages. A summary of the responses
of the degree of worry participants felt are given in Table 7.4. This table shows that a
majority of participants had little to no worry about the permanence of their information
on the Internet in general. However, there were 11 participants that were either “Fairly
Worried” or “Really Worried” about this subject.
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Some participants said they focus on being careful with their sensitive information
online. Other participants explained they are careful with what they put on the Internet
in general or don’t put that much information on the Internet in the first place. Many of
the participants that employed these self-filtering coping mechanisms expressed little to
no worry about the permanence of their information on the Internet. These responses
confirm the results of other work showing users self-filtering as they deal with their data
on the Internet [22, 48]. Along the lines of self-filtering, P10A stated:
“I am like fairly cautious about what I do decide to like post, cuz I know that
it is pretty permanent what I put out there. And so, I guess I just like think
about what I’m posting. So, I’m not like, super frivolous with the information
that I send out I guess.”
Some participants gave feedback about their concerns of their information reaching
unintended audiences or negatively affecting their future. This feedback further confirms
the results of work by Wang et al. [44] and Woodruff [47] as described in Section 2. Even
though several participants explained they employ strategies to limit their data footprint
online, the same participants expressed worries about their information negatively affecting
their future or reaching unintended audiences. For example, P18A and P23B respectively
stated:
“I just don’t want stuff to come back and haunt me. You know, people do
stupid stuff and post it, so, I don’t want to be that guy not to get the job
because some stupid decision way back when... I don’t know, I feel like I don’t
need to put information online, and so I limit it.”
“I’m considerably worried about it. It was one of the main reasons that I took
so long to go into social media. Because of my background teaching junior
high and high school, I know that anything you put on the Internet is there
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forever and it is virtually impossible to clear, like if I were to post a picture
on there and say no I don’t want that picture on there and somebody wanted
to... If people wanted to use it maliciously it would be virtually impossible to
track down in my opinion.”

When asked about information permanence on the Internet, 12 participants discussed social media. In general, the points participants brought up about permanence and
social media reflect responses and data gathered in other work involved with social media,
data ephermerality, and data permanence [7, 20, 49]. For example, some participants
indicated they would be more willing to frequently use social media if it didn’t come with
problems related to data permanence. While discussing the permanence of information on
social media, participants not only expressed the need to be careful about what individuals
post about themselves, but they also expressed worry about the permanent effects of
someone posting others’ sensitive information. For example, P22A and P7A stated:
“I get pretty worried. Not because I post anything dumb. But just because
like if someone posts something about what I’m featured in or tagged in for an
example, like I have no control of that.”
“... Like Facebook, like all your information is just kind of out there all the
time, and again I try to be aware of what I put out there, but I feel like there’s
just all these creepy people out there, you know, that just will kind of just read
more into it... Or just like pull... I don’t know, maybe just kind of glean stuff
little by little, so that worries me sometimes, but... I try not to think about
that all the time.”
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Code
Careful with what I put on the Internet in general
Has social media worries
Careful with sensitive information online
Worried about identity theft
Don’t put that much on the Internet in the first place
There’s probably information I don’t want out there
I’m not sure what I can do past what I’m doing already
Worried about identity theft
I probably should be more worried
I trust websites and their security measures
I forget where I have put my information on the Internet
I try not to think about it
I don’t know how the Internet works
Google knows everything
It’s not life or death
I’m not worried about my flirtatious texts being read
Worried about permanence of passwords
I research companies I do business with
Companies have the right to look at my information

#
13
12
10
6
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1

Table 7.5: Codes for Internet permanence concerns.
Participants expressed many ideas and reasons for their level of concern for this
subject. For brevity, the codes related to these concerns, as well as the number of
participants that expressed them, are summarized in Table 7.5.
7.4.4

Interest in Short-Lived Keys Tools

When asked about whether they would want to use a tool that makes messages unreadable
after a certain period of time, 35 participants answered in the affirmative, 5 responded
negatively, and 3 participants expressed indifference to the idea. P20A expressed their
desire for this kind of tool saying:
“Yeah, I’d be really interested in that. I feel like if I don’t use something in
a long time, then I don’t need it. And if it gets deleted then it won’t matter.
But, because you forget that you even have that information it’s still out there
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somewhere and you forget to go back and delete it, so...it would be nice to have
something that gets it automatically deleted.”
Seven participants explained they would want to use the tool only if they had the
need, and 6 said they liked having the option available. On this vein of thought, P24B
said:
“I tend to let my email inbox pile up I don’t keep it cleaned out and permanently
delete things probably the way I should. But on the other hand, I would like
the option.”
Further, 3 participants stated they wouldn’t want to use this kind of tool in their
everyday transactions. For example, P17A stated:
“I wouldn’t necessarily want that to happen with everything. Cause there is
some stuff I put on the Internet to make sure it stays there forever because
eventually I need to delete pictures off my phone, you know.”

7.5

Sending Sensitive Emails

During the exit interview, participants were also asked about whether they send sensitive
information through email. Overall, 12 participants responded saying they do send
sensitive information through email, 20 said they don’t, and 16 indicated they sometimes
do this. Participants who indicated they have or do send sensitive information were also
asked what kind of sensitive information they send. The responses to this question are
summarized in Table 7.6.
Some participants expressed that they prefer to use modes of communication
besides email to communicate sensitive information. For example, 10 participants said
they preferred to use phone calls for this purpose, 5 participants prefer to talk to people
in person, 6 participants prefer texting, and 1 participant prefers sending sensitive
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Type of Sensitive Information
Account (usernames, passwords)
Tax
Insurance
School
Banking
Credit card
Immigration
Addresses

#
7
5
5
4
4
3
1
1

Table 7.6: Types of sensitive information participants indicated they send through email.
information through pictures. Interestingly, participants that expressed preferring some of
these modes of communication to email for communicating sensitive information reasoned
about the security of their preferred modes compared to the security of email. For example,
P10A and P23A stated:
“I guess a text isn’t much better than email. But yeah, I haven’t done too much
through email. Just because I know that like people can view that information...
Kinda freaks me out.”
“I don’t like... to send stuff through email that needs to be secure. I would
rather, like, phone and talk to the person that needs the information and give
it to them. Or... Take a picture of it and send it via picture rather than email.
I don’t know that it’s any more secure, but I kinda feel like it is.”
7.5.1

Likes

Participants were asked about what they liked about LTK and SLK. In response to this
question, 29 participants said they liked that the prototypes were user friendly and 23
expressed that the prototypes were straightforward/simple. For example, P8B, and P6A
respectively stated:
“I feel that they were extremely easy to operate... After I understood the basics,
it was breeze to get through... the task... It was very easy to use. Very user
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friendly, like it wouldn’t take an advanced specialist to operate the tasks. It
could be anybody.”
“They definitely didn’t seem complicated at all. Which was nice. Like, it made
it feel like, you know, there were less ways to make it go wrong or something.”
Some participants also liked the make unreadable functionality (9) and expiration
functionality (8) of SLK. Expressing ideas related to this functionality, P3A said:
“When I was using the second one, I realized that it was very nice to be able to
kind of digitally destroy whatever information I had already sent and received.”
Ease of setup was another thing participants brought up that they liked about the
prototypes. Overall, 10 participants expressed appreciation for this feature. Relatedly, 9
participants commented on the usefulness of the inline tutorials that were available as
participants first used the prototypes. Talking about the tutorials, P4B stated:
“It would like highlight a little area and it would say, ‘This button is what you
do for this and this is how you encrypt and this how you delete’ and stuff like
that. So, I thought that was very helpful and made it much more user friendly
instead of just me having to play around and figure out what the prototypes do
by myself. I thought that was very good.”
Importantly, participants said that they liked that they felt secure while using
these prototypes. Overall, 14 participants expressed this view. For 5 of these participants,
the access requests they saw as part of the email-based key exchange made the prototype
feel more secure. P4B expressed this feeling of security by simply saying:
“I like that it gave me a sense of security in my emails.”
Tutorials in both prototypes highlighted that Google would not be able to read
emails encrypted with the prototypes. This concept stood out to 5 of our study participants.
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Code
The prototypes were user friendly
The prototypes were straightforward/simple
They felt secure
Easy to set up
Liked make unreadable functionality
Liked inline tutorials
Liked expiration functionality
Liked labels
Access request made it feel more secure
Google cannot read encrypted emails
Integrated well with Gmail
Liked color scheme
It was quick
Liked button placement
Liked encryption animation
Good level of privacy vs. ease of use

#
29
23
14
10
9
9
8
6
5
5
2
2
1
1
1
1

Table 7.7: Codes for things participants liked about LTK, SLK, or both.
Interestingly, for several of the participants, this concept seems to have stood out to them,
because they had never thought about Google having the ability to read their emails
before. For example, P12A stated:
“I thought it was cool that Gmail couldn’t read it. I didn’t think of Gmail
reading my emails before.”
The things participants liked about the two prototypes are expressed in the codes
summarized in Table 7.7.
7.5.2

Dislikes

Participants were also asked about what they disliked about LTK and SLK. While at
least 8 participants expressed that it was hard to think of something they disliked, or
they couldn’t think of anything they disliked, many participants gave useful feedback and
criticisms on how the prototypes could be better. Generally, participants’ dislikes of the
prototypes centered on what was confusing and what they did not understand. Much
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of these misunderstandings were related to the functionality of the “Make Unreadable”
button, the meaning of expiration, and the access requests participants saw through the
key exchange process. Some of these misunderstandings and points of confusion are seen
in the following statements made respectively by P22A and P12B:
“I guess I just didn’t understand that when I clicked make unreadable, it wasn’t
make unreadable to the person who I sent it to. It’s make unreadable to me.”
“I didn’t understand why the other person has to... ask for access. And then
the system will automatically send that or give the access... I just don’t know
why there is this step... I think that if the system can automatically verify the
other person’s identity why should I, why should it bother. And then if it can’t
why does it automatically send out the access?”
While many participants liked the make unreadable functionality of SLK, others
did not. For example, P20B said:
“The finality of the unreadable tool. Which makes sense though because if you
like shred a paper it would be the same thing, just for your email. But, it made
me feel a little nervous for some reason. Because you expect to be able to find
anything you need on the Internet.”
Three participants felt the two prototypes would be improved by adding a master
password to keep unwanted eyes off encrypted email. Another participant, P20B, expressed
a need for a way to give people access to secure emails from multiple devices. They
explained:
“Let’s say that like people left... Their computer and not check email, but like
let’s say ask for the access. That person can receive the notification from their
phone and just push it and give me access to get the... information so I don’t
have to wait for the person to get back to me.”
Codes gathered from responses to this question are summarized in Table 7.8.
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Code
Hard to think of something I disliked
LTK was better
SLK was better
Did not like the color choices in the prototypes
Needs master password
Did not like the key exchange
Both prototypes were good
Wants warning added to “Make Unreadable” button
Worried about whether or not friend revokes access
Did not like the prototype download page
Wants encryption turned on automatically
Secure email tools should work with multiple email accounts
Should work with multiple devices
Did not like MessageGuard overlays
Misunderstood MessageGuard overlays
Wants unencrypted replies available
Wants more involved key exchange ceremony
Did not feel secure
Make tutorials always available

#
8
4
4
4
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Table 7.8: Codes for things participants disliked about LTK, SLK, or both.
7.5.3

Other Feedback

We received a large array of miscellaneous feedback throughout the course of the exit
interviews we conducted. For example, 3 participants expressed that many of the problems
they encountered were their own fault due to their exploration of the prototype. Five
participants were unsure about installing the prototypes due to the permissions they
requested. Further, two participants highlighted the significance in prototype testing
order by saying the second prototype they tested was easier to use due to their experience
with the first prototype.
Several participants expressed concerns about knowing whether a secure email tool
is actually secure. Another participant indicated that a secure email tool that is too easy
to use may seem insecure. These ideas are summarized, respectively, by P10B and P11A
in the following statements:

88

“I’m just kinda a paranoid person when it comes to Internet security in general.
It’s probably cuz my dad works in IT security stuff, so he’s kinda just ingrained
in that into me and my siblings... I’m just wary of sending any type of sensitive,
personal information on the Internet regardless. So, I think if I were to use
something like this, I would want to heavily do more research to be 100% sure
that this is safe to use.”
“That made it all seem like phony because it was so easy.”
One participant (P22B) argued that nothing can be too secure these days. They
also summarized many other participants’ concerns about hackers when they said:
“I got sold I suppose on it just because you can never be too secure, especially
these days, how you know technology’s improving and like how hackers are
getting more powerful as well. And so, I thought, you know, it gave me
satisfaction to be able to use a tool in particular the version B of it. And so,
it was good I liked it. It was simple.”

Figure 7.1: A summary of participant responses to the encryption outlook questions.
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Not Very
Likely

Unsure

Likely

Very Likely

6

2

26

10

Table 7.9: A summary of responses on how likely participants are to use either LTK or
SLK in the future.
7.5.4

Encryption Outlook

At the end of the study survey, we asked participants to answer two Likert-scale questions
based on their future potential use of encrypted email:
1. I want to be able to encrypt my email.
2. I would encrypt email frequently.
The results of the responses to these questions are shown in Figure 7.1. In general,
we see a trend similar to data gathered by Ruoti et al. [31, 34]. Essentially, a majority
of participants indicate they want to be able to encrypt their email, but the majority of
participants do not expect to encrypt their email frequently. This calls for secure email
tools to be implemented in such a way that their usability is tailored to infrequent use
scenarios.
As part of the exit interview, participants were also asked about how likely they
were to use either LTK or SLK in the future. A summary of the responses participants
gave related to their likelihood of future use of these prototypes are shown in Table 7.9.
The table shows that most participants would be at least likely to use one of these
prototypes in the future.
More commentary from participants on this subject sheds more light on these
likelihood values. For example, 15 participants indicated that they don’t need this kind of
tool in their current life situations. Further, 13 participants guessed they would use a tool
like this infrequently in the future, while only 3 expect to use it frequently. This feedback
matches up well with the encryption outlook quantitative data shown in Figure 7.1.
Fifteen participants also indicated their future use of one of these prototypes would
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depend on the context they find themselves in. Some of the participants expressing these
sentiments were P13B and P17B, who respectively said:
“I probably wouldn’t use it unless I had like a business and I had to have like
secure information. If I had a business where I need to delete information,
I can see myself wanting to have something like that maybe. But, there are
some emails I don’t want people to see that I could see using it if it’s a free
thing. But, if I had a business I could see wanting to buy it. But, if it’s on my
own, I probably wouldn’t buy it.”
“I’m planning on going into counseling psychology where we just, we have...
this obsession almost with keeping things confidential and I love keeping whatever I can confidential... So, being able to have a system, especially if the
system were well known and were well trusted by the general population, being
able to exchange that sensitive information when absolutely necessary would
be useful...”
Some participants expressed that having these prototypes available would allow
them to feel safe sending secure information through email, something they have avoided
in the past because they didn’t feel safe doing so. For example, P17A stated:
“I don’t often send secure information over email anyway. But, I think if I
had the option to, I would... I didn’t ever have a tool like this, so I’ve always
thought like ‘oh it’s not safe’, so I don’t send anything over email that’s secure.
With an option like this, I would be much more likely to do it. Definitely with
B and even A.”
Participant P10B made an important point about the importance of trust in a
secure email tool dictating possible future use. They said:
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Code
I don’t need this right now
Future use depends on context
I would only use this occasionally in the future
Would prefer to use SLK
I would use this frequently in the future
Wants more information on how it works
Would prefer to use LTK
Would use either of the prototypes
Doesn’t expect to send encrypted messages
Onboarding complicates desire for future use
Prefer to do sensitive things in person
Wants other people/entities to use one of these prototypes
Feel safer with these prototypes vs phone

#
15
15
13
10
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1

Table 7.10: Codes related to the likelihood of participants using LTK or SLK in the
future.
“I mean a big part of it depends on if I actually 100% trust the system.
So, assuming that I do. Being raised with the paranoia of Internet security,
I probably would use it a lot. But again, that’s assuming that I have full
confidence in it.”
The sentiments expressed by participants when they were asked this question are
summarized by the codes seen in Table 7.10.

7.6

Misconceptions

As we conducted, transcribed, and coded interviews, we discovered several misconceptions
users had about our prototypes, especially SLK. For instance, several participants expressed that they could simply send their friend another access request on the encrypted
thread once they revoked access to the thread by making it unreadable. Interestingly,
several other participants made statements indicating they thought access to the encrypted
thread was revoked for their friend when they revoked it on their side. For example,
talking about why they liked SLK, P3B said:
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“Because you could... delete the encrypted message so my friend couldn’t see
it anymore.”
This misconception not only shows that steps should be taken to explain this is
not the case in our prototype, but it also gives some insight into the fact that participants
are thinking about this kind of feature and may want it in future tools.
Several participants made incorrect statements on how the encryption works and is
used in these prototypes. For example, one participant (P18B) thought that before using
the “Make Unreadable” button, their secure emails were in an unencrypted state. This
participant reasoned that using the “Make Unreadable” button encrypted the messages
so they couldn’t be read again. Future work can clearly do more to provide tutorials and
steps in the prototype setup that help clear up these misconceptions.
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Chapter 8
Discussion

In this chapter, we further discuss quantitative and qualitative results presented
in Chapters 6 and 7. Reviewing and discussing these two sets of results at the same time
allows us to better understand the information in each section. For example, while there
were some limitations to the quantitative results in Chapter 6, looking at the qualitative
results from Chapter 7 gives more clues as to why SLK had a significantly higher SUS
score and was chosen as the favorite prototype more often.

8.1

SUS and Favorite Prototypes Revisited

While many participants felt both prototypes were “straightforward” and very user
friendly, a majority of participants choose SLK as their favorite prototype and the
difference between the two prototype’s SUS scores was statistically significant. However,
due to the limitations presented by the lack of make unreadable functionality in the LTK
prototype, it is unclear whether participants preferred short-lived keys over long-term
keys. Still, the qualitative data presented in Section 7 sheds some light on why a majority
of participants responded in favor of B. A majority of participants feel SLK is more secure
than LTK and they trust SLK more than LTK. Participants feel this way about SLK
for a variety of reasons, but in general, they like the “Make Unreadable” button, the
expiration functionality, and the management of expired messages through the popup.
Overall, participants showed strong preferences to functionality allowing them to make
their messages unreadable.
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Participants who chose LTK as their favorite also did so for a variety of reasons.
However, the most common reason seems to be that they felt more confident using LTK.
In general, participants expressing more confidence in using LTK over SLK seem to do so
because they appeared to lose confidence in SLK due to a misunderstanding of the “Make
Unreadable” button. For example, several participants misunderstood how the “Make
Unreadable” button works and either clicked it too early while exploring its functionality
or felt nervous using it.

8.2

Information Permanence

In general, participants from our study seem to be more worried about the permanence
of their general Internet information than the permanence of their messages on of their
devices. However, in both categories of permanence, a majority of participants express
little to no worry. Interestingly, many of the participants that expressed little to no worry
about these categories also explained that they feel this way because they employ a variety
of strategies to manage their information, especially sensitive information. The actions
they take to manage their information may indicate that they are more worried about
the permanence of their information than they expressed in their interviews.
In our interviews, a majority of participants responded that they would be interested
in using a tool that makes their messages unreadable after a certain period of time. There
could be several reasons explaining why so many users are interested having such a tool
available. As discussed above, participants have a wide variety of information permanence
worries and they employ a range of strategies to manage their information on the Internet.
In some cases, participants expressed that even though they employ these strategies, they
still may have information they don’t want “out there”.
It may be that participants from our study recognize that such a tool would help
them with these worries and would simplify the way they manage their messages online.
Further, several participants expressed that they do not send sensitive emails or share
95

much information online, but would like the ability to do so safely. It may be that these
participants also recognized that a tool that makes messages or information unreadable
after a certain period of time would give them the option to start safely sending and
sharing sensitive information.

8.3

Prototype Design

Analysis of the qualitative results from this study makes it clear the design of both of our
prototypes can be improved. The most important design lesson we learn from participant
feedback is that there is no one size fits all solution for a secure email tool that uses
short-lived keys. While some participants like the idea of completely automatic key
destruction, others support the partially automatic approach we took. Other participants
even suggested a hybrid approach: one that would warn users with the expired message
management popup sometime before the keys expire, but would also automatically destroy
the keys once they expire. Further, even though most participants support the notion
of thread-based bundling for encryption and expiration, many of the same participants
expressed interest in single message expiration. Finally, many participants supported the
idea of an option to explicitly set expiration times for messages, but also supported the
use of a default time. Even though many participants supported the use of one month as
a default time, some participants suggested a variety of longer and shorter default times.
Essentially, participants’ opinions of the ideal short-lived keys tool differ drastically.
This suggests the need for a tool that has reasonable defaults, but also allows its shortlived keys options to be customized. Customizable options could include settings for
key coverage, expiration, message bundling, and automation of key destruction. Adding
such options would require further design exploration, as well as security and usability
analysis. A better short-lived keys tool would also add more tutorials to help reduce user
misconceptions. These tutorials would teach users about the key exchange as well as
specific features related to short-lived keys.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work

In this thesis, we advanced the knowledge of the usability and security of short-lived
keys. First, we explored the usability and security space of short lived keys, generating
important questions and ideas, as well as gathering initial feedback from people through
a short pilot study. Second, we designed and implemented a short-lived keys secure
email prototype supporting email-based key exchange. Third, we conducted a user study
using pairs of participants. In the study, participants tested two secure email prototypes:
one based on short-lived keys and one that used a more traditional long-term keys
approach. Quantitative and qualitative data was gathered through survey questions and
semi-structured interviews.
The user study results show that study participants trusted the short-lived keys
prototype more and felt it was more secure than the long-term keys prototype. In general,
participants liked the ability to make their messages permanently unreadable and would
like to have short-lived keys tools available in the future. They also gave valuable feedback
about short-lived keys user interface features and key management options. This feedback
can be used to help implement short-lived keys tools that are highly usable and meet user
needs.
Participants from this study also gave interesting feedback about their perceptions
and worries about information permanence. In general, participants said they had little
worry about the permanence of their online information and messages, but revealed a
greater degree of worry than they initially admitted as they discussed the coping strategies
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they use to manage the permanence of their information. Even though participants say
they aren’t worried about the permanence of their information, they generally try not to
include sensitive information in their messages and are careful about what they put on
the Internet.
While this thesis research answers many important questions, the results reveal
further research to better understand short-lived keys, as well as user perceptions and
worries of information permanence. Ideas for future work include the following:
1. Design Short-Lived Keys Longitudinal Study: Our lab study of the shortlived keys prototype was an appropriate first step in exploring the viability of
short-lived keys. Use the promising results and feedback from this study to design a
longitudinal study that will more realistically test of the usability of the prototype.
One significant challenge in this effort is that users only expect to use secure email
occasionally.
2. Customizable Short-Lived Keys Prototype:

Implement a short-lived keys

secure email prototype that provides some amount of customization for key coverage, key expiration, automation of key destruction, and message bundling. More
exploration, prototypes, and usability studies are needed to find a balance between
usability and these customization options.
3. Deeper Study of Trade-offs: Users may be able to provide better short-lived
keys feedback if they better understand a prototype’s usability and security models.
Conduct a user study where coordinators explain these models to participants and
gather this feedback. The study can use a methodology similar to that used by
Bai et al. [3] where users receive some instruction about the prototypes they test,
allowing them comment on the trade-offs and give further design insights.
4. Multiple Device Study: Conduct a user study exploring the usability and security
of short-lived keys in a scenario involving multiple devices.
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5. Mechanical Turk Survey on Information Permanence: Design a Mechanical Turk survey that involves a much larger sample to explore user information
permanence concerns, perceptions, and coping strategies.
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Appendix A
Pilot Study Documents
A.1

Semi-Structured Interview Outline

1. My research involves creating secure email tools that help everyday people send
encrypted messages so their information can be more secure. Weve already had
some success with a tool for Gmail called MessageGuard, but are looking for ways
to make it even better. Right now, were working on a new version of the tool that
makes encrypted emails unreadable after a period of time.
2. In a tool like this, how long would you want these messages to exist before they
become unreadable?
• Get initial response.
• Explain and ask about “Currently, we are thinking about letting a message
have an initial expiration of 2 weeks, then have the expiration go down to 2
days after the message is opened for the first time” and show the related image.
• Would this approach work in this tool?
• Should the time be longer? Shorter?
3. What do you think about adding these countdown timers to the webmail interface
to let users know when the message will become unreadable? Show the appropriate
image.
4. When an encrypted message expires and should be rendered unreadable, should the
software:
(a) A: Do it automatically without telling you?
(b) B: Warn you, letting you choose to keep the message around longer if you want
to? (Show popup image)
(c) C: Solely rely on your to initiate making the message unreadable? (Show
“Make Unreadable” button image).
(d) D: Have a combination of the above options?
107

(e) Would you prefer to have options like this integrated into the UI, or show up
as an interactive pop up?
5. Ask about the wording of the text and labels. (Show text options)
6. How should expirable messages be bundled?
(a) Get initial response from participant.
(b) Explain, ”Currently, we are thinking about having all messages on an email
thread be bundled together for expiration.” Would you prefer it to work like
this?
(c) Should each message expire by itself?
(d) Should each email thread expire together?
(e) Should all the messages from all contacts in a period of time expire together?
7. Is a tool with these features something you could see yourself using?
(a) What could it be used for?
(b) How often would it be used?
A.2

User Interface Mock-ups
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Appendix B
User Study Methodology
B.1
B.1.1

User Study Documents
Recruitment Poster
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B.1.2

Participant Consent Form
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Consent to be a Research Subject
Introduction
This research study is being conducted at Brigham Young University under the supervision of Dr. Kent Seamons, a faculty
member in the Computer Science Department at BYU.
Procedures
If you agree to participate in this research study, the following will occur:
•
•

In this study, the two of you will be in different rooms and will use email to communicate with each other.
You will each be asked to play the role of another person. We will provide you with information about this
person. During the study, please use the provided information and not your own personal information.

Risks/Discomforts & Benefits
There is little to no risk to the participants in this study. In order to minimize the risk of any harm, we will not collect any
personal information. The purpose of the study is to learn how to design systems that are easy to use. Do not be
concerned if you happen to make a mistake or fail to complete a task. You will be helping us reach our objective. If you
experience any discomfort, you may stop the study at any time. There are no direct benefits to you for participating in
this study. The study will take approximately 50 minutes.
Confidentiality
During the course of this study we will be recording what is happening on the computer screen you are using as well as
any verbal communication with the study coordinators. These recordings will not be seen by anyone beside the
researchers and will be destroyed once our research is complete. We will not collect any personally identifying
information. Your answers to the study survey will be stored in a password-protected account. Only the researchers will
have access to this data. A unique, random ID will be generated for each study participant, and this ID will be used in
place of any personally identifying information. Data will largely be presented in aggregate, but when direct quotes are
required, they will be provided alongside the associated ID and will not contain personally identifying information. We
may share research data on the Internet, but will not include any personally identifying information with this data.
Compensation & Participation
You will be compensated $15 for your participation. Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You have the right to
withdraw at any point during the study or to refuse participation entirely. If you withdraw before the end of the study,
you will still receive the full $15 compensation.
Research Software Warning
The software you use in this study is research software. For your own safety, you should not use this software outside of
this study. Usage of this software outside of the study may result in stolen information or computer compromise.
Questions about the Research
If you have any questions about this study, you may contact Dr. Kent Seamons for further information:
Kent Seamons; seamons@cs.byu.edu ; (801) 422-3722
Questions about Your Rights as a Research Participant
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, please contact:
IRB Administrator at (801) 422-1461; A-285 ASB, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602; irb@byu.edu.
Statement of Consent
I have read, understood, and received a copy of the above consent and desire of my own free will to participate.
Name (Printed):
Signature:
Date:

B.1.3

Study Coordinator A Instructions
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Study Coordinator A
1. When the two users arrive and have signed the consent form, read them the following:
Welcome to our email study. We are the study coordinators and are here to assist you as
needed.
In this study, the two of you will be in different rooms and will use email to communicate with
each other. You will each be asked to play the role of another person. We will provide you with
information about this person. During the study, please use the provided information and not
your own personal information. Further, feel free to communicate with your friend the way you
normally would while working through the scenarios. There may be times where you have to
wait for an email. In these times, please feel free to use the Internet or your phone.
If you have any questions or concerns, feel free to ask us. A study coordinator will be with you at
all times to observe the study and also to answer any questions you may have.
2. Flip a coin. If the coin is heads up, you will be working with the participant on the left. If the coin is
tails up, you will be working with the participant on the right.
3. Make sure the other coordinator knows the study number.
4. Take the participant to study room A. Complete the following setup steps:
a. Ask the participant to sit down.
b. Start the audio recorder
c. Ope Ope Broad asti g “oft are . “tart re ordi g.
d. O the desktop, li k the “tart “ur e i o .
e. Enter the study number, click next.
f. Instruct the participant to start working on the survey.
5. Before using each system, the survey will instruct the participant to tell you they are ready to begin
the next task. When they do so, complete the following steps:
a. Look at which system the participant will be using, and provide them with the corresponding
information sheet (A.1 or B.1).
b. Start the VM software.
c. Restore the appropriate snapshot (VM->snapshot->Two Person Study)
d. Change the view to full screen-exclusive mode. (View->Full Screen; View->Exclusive)
e. Instruct the participant to begin the task.
6. During the course of the test, pay attention to the following items:
a. Make notes of anything interesting you see. At the end of the study, you can ask the
participant about these events.
b. If the participant sends sensitive information in the clear, make a note of this, then instruct
them that they need to use the secure email system to send that information.
c. During the study, participants may have questions for you. Answer any questions regarding
the study task, but do not instruct participants on how to use the systems being tested.
Instead, encourage them to continue trying. Remind them that there may be help on the
website they were provided.
d. End the tasks if they take too long. Record this failure.

i. End the test after 20 minutes unless the participant seems to be 1 – 2 minutes away
from finishing all the tasks for the current system
ii. If you end the task, inform the other study coordinator that you have done so.
iii. The follo i g odes a e i put i to the parti ipa t’s sur e to allo the to
continue when you have had to end a task early:
System
Long-Term Keys (A)
Short-Lived Keys (B)

Confirmation Code
LDDLDHVO
OLOWXTUU

PIN
3866
8111

7. After the initial task, the participant will inform you they are ready to begin the next task. This task
requires them to go back to their email to retrieve the information they received from their friend in
the last task. Do the following for the next task:
a. Take their info sheet with the confirmation code and the PIN. Do not give the sheet back to
the participant.
b. If testing the Short-Lived Keys system (B), use the options page of the MessageGuard
chrome extension to expire the participant’s keys.
c. Help them role play the passing of time by telling them 3 days have passed and it is now
April 6th. Instruct them to flip the calendar to that date.
d. Put the VM back in exclusive mode and give them the appropriate worksheet (A.2 or B.2).
e. For Short-Lived Keys (B): If the user does ’t atte pt to ake sure the essage a e er e
read again, remind them to do so. If they indicate they have already tried, let the task end.
f. If the user i di ates the a ’t retrie e the i for atio agai , take ote of the o urre e,
direct them to the survey, and give them the confirmation code and PIN to get to the next
part of the survey.
8. Through the survey, the participant will be given the task of determining what a snooper could have
seen. This does not require anything on your part. However, you should watch them closely and be
read to help the if the eed it. Re e er, do ’t give the answer, but encourage the participant
to try to figure it out.
9. When all the tasks are complete for a system, the participant will be instructed to tell you they have
finished. When they do so, complete the following steps:
a. Ensure that the participants have correctly completed all the tasks.
b. Reset the VM snapshot.
c. Instruct the participant to continue working on the survey.
10. When the survey is finished, conduct the exit interview. Remember, this is a very important part of
the study and should not be skipped or conducted too quickly unless participants are pressed for
time.
a. Usability Experience Questions
i. Tell me about your experience using these tools (Asking more questions as
necessary).
ii. What are some things that stood out to you? Why?
iii. What did you like about the two tools you tested? Why?
iv. What did you not like about it? Why?
v. In the {first, second} tool, an email thread has a lifespan of two weeks at first and is
bumped down to two days after the first message in the thread is opened.

1. Do you think this is a good default for expiration timing?
2. How much control would you want over setting expiration times? Would
you like to explicitly decide for each email thread, or would you rather the
tool do it all for you?
vi. What did you think about the red countdown timers? Would you want these kinds
of indicators in a tool that expires messages?
vii. In the {first, second} tool, you could choose to expire an encrypted thread by
pushi g the Per a e tl E pire this Thread utto , or ou ould ait u til the
timer ran up before choosing to expire or retain the encrypted thread. Is there
another way you would prefer to manage expired encrypted emails? For example,
would you rather have the tool take care of it for you and not ask you?
viii. Is modal or integrated SLK management better?
ix. In the {first, second} tool, the encrypted emails on one thread were all protected
together and expired together. Is there another way you would prefer to have these
expirable encrypted messages protected? For example, would you prefer each
message be protected by itself, or would you rather have all encrypted messages
from all contacts over a period of time be protected?
x. Of the two tools you tested, which one did you feel was more secure and why?
xi. Of the two tools you tested, which one do you trust more and why?
xii. Without a tool like this, how long do your emails exist in your inbox before they are
deleted?
xiii. How likely are you to use tool A or tool B in the future?
b. Message Permanence Questions
i. To what degree are you worried about the permanence of your emails and
messages on your mobile devices, laptops, desktops, or other devices? Why?
ii. To what degree are you worried about the permanence of your information on the
Internet in general?
iii. Would you like to use a tool that makes your message unreadable after a certain
period of time? Why?
c. General Questions
i. Do you ever send sensitive information through email? (usernames, passwords, SSN,
financial information, other...)
1. If so:
a. How often do you send sensitive information and what kind of
information do you send?
b. Do you ever hesitate, to do this for security purposes?
c. Do you delete the sensitive email after sending it?
2. If not:
a. In what situations can you see yourself sending sensitive
information?
b. How often would you expect this to happen?
c. Would you delete the sensitive email after sending it?
11. Thank the participants for their time. Help them fill out the compensation forms. Send them to the
CS office to be compensated.

a. Inform the participants they must each take their own form to the CS office
b. Inform the participants of the general CS office operating hours
i. Generally 9am – 5pm on weekdays, closed from 12pm – 1pm for lunch
12. Stop the screen recorder. Stop the audio recording.

B.1.4

Study Coordinator B Instructions
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Study Coordinator B
1. When the two users arrive, the other coordinator will read them the introduction and select one of
the participants. You will work with the other participant.
2. Get the study number from the other coordinator.
3. Take the appropriate participant to the other study room. Complete the following setup steps:
a. Ask the participant to sit down.
b. Start the audio recorder
c. Ope Ope Broad asti g “oft are . “tart re ordi g.
d. O the desktop, li k the “tart “ur e i o . Enter the study number.
e. Instruct the participant to start working on the survey.
4. Before using each system, the survey will instruct the participant to tell you they are ready to begin
the next task. When they do so, complete the following steps:
a. Provide the participant with the general worksheet.
b. Start the VM software and restore the appropriate snapshot.
c. Change the view to full screen-exclusive mode. (View->Full Screen; View->Exclusive)
d. On the first task, inform them it may be a few minutes before their friend sends them an
email. Inform them they should check their mail once or twice a minute, but can use the
Internet in the meantime.
5. During the course of the task pay attention to the following items:
a. Make notes of anything interesting you see. At the end of the study, you can ask the
participant about these events.
b. If the participant sends sensitive information in the clear, make a note of this, then instruct
them that they need to use the secure email system to send that information.
c. During the study, participants may have questions for you. Answer any questions regarding
the study task, but do not instruct participants on how to use the systems being tested.
Instead, encourage them to continue trying. You may remind them that they can
communicate with their friend to get help.
d. End the tasks if they take longer than 20 minutes (give or take 1-2 minutes). Record this
failure.
i. If you end the task, inform the other study coordinator that you have done so.
ii. The follo i g odes a e i put i to the parti ipa t’s survey to allow them to
continue when you have had to end a task early:
System
SSN
PIN
Long-Term Keys (A)
979-65-3363
1988
Short-Lived Keys (B)
264-94-8748
6576
6. After the initial task, the participant will inform you they are ready to begin the next task. The new
task requires them to go back to their email to retrieve the information they received from their
friend in the last task. Do the following for the next task:
a. Take their info sheet with the SSN and the PIN. Do not give the sheet back to the participant.

b. If testing the Short-Lived Keys system (B), use the options page of the MessageGuard
chro e e tension to e pire the participant’s ke s.
c. Help them role play the passing of time by telling them 3 days have passed and it is now
Thursday, April 6th. Instruct them to flip the calendar to that date.
d. Put the VM back in exclusive mode and give them the appropriate worksheet (A.2 or B.2).
e. For Short-Lived Keys (B): If the user does ’t atte pt to per a e tl e pire the ke s, re i d
them to do so. If they indicate they have already tried, let the task end.
f. If the user i di ates the a ’t retrie e the i for atio agai :
i. Take note of the occurrence
ii. Direct them to the survey
iii. Give them the confirmation code and PIN to get to the next part of the survey.
g. When the user is done with this task, help them get to the survey again.
7. Through the survey, the participant will be given the task of determining what a snooper could have
seen. This does not require anything on your part. However, you should watch them closely and be
read to help the if the eed it. Re e er, do ’t gi e the a s er, ut e ourage them to try to
figure it out.
8. When all the tasks are complete for a system, the participants will be instructed to tell you they
have finished the task. When they do so, complete the following steps:
a. Ensure the participant have correctly completed all of the tasks.
b. Exit exclusive mode by pressing right ctrl + right alt.
c. Reset the snapshot on the VM.
d. Switch to the window that had the participants survey open.
e. Instruct the participant to continue with the survey.
9. When the survey is finished, conduct the exit interview. Remember, this is a very important part of
the study and should not be skipped or conducted too quickly unless participants need to leave
quickly.
a. Usability Experience Questions
i. Tell me about your experience using these tools (Asking more questions as
necessary).
ii. What are some things that stood out to you? Why?
iii. What did you like about the two tools you tested? Why?
iv. What did you not like about it? Why?
v. In the {first, second} tool, an email thread has a lifespan of two weeks at first and is
bumped down to two days after the first message in the thread is opened.
1. Do you think this is a good default for expiration timing?
2. How much control would you want over setting expiration times? Would
you like to explicitly decide for each email thread, or would you rather the
tool do it all for you?
vi. What did you think about the red countdown timers? Would you want these kinds
of indicators in a tool that expires messages?
vii. In the {first, second} tool, you could choose to expire an encrypted thread by
pushi g the Per a e tl E pire this Thread utto , or ou ould ait u til the
timer ran up before choosing to expire or retain the encrypted thread. Is there

another way you would prefer to manage expired encrypted emails? For example,
would you rather have the tool take care of it for you and not ask you?
viii. Is modal or integrated SLK management better?
ix. In the {first, second} tool, the encrypted emails on one thread were all protected
together and expired together. Is there another way you would prefer to have these
expirable encrypted messages protected? For example, would you prefer each
message be protected by itself, or would you rather have all encrypted messages
from all contacts over a period of time be protected?
x. Of the two tools you tested, which one did you feel was more secure and why?
xi. Of the two tools you tested, which one do you trust more and why?
xii. Without a tool like this, how long do your emails exist in your inbox before they are
deleted?
xiii. How likely are you to use tool A or tool B in the future?
b. Message Permanence Questions
i. To what degree are you worried about the permanence of your emails and
messages on your mobile devices, laptops, desktops, or other devices? Why?
ii. To what degree are you worried about the permanence of your information on the
Internet in general?
iii. Would you like to use a tool that makes your message unreadable after a certain
period of time? Why?
c. General Questions
i. Do you ever send sensitive information through email? (usernames, passwords, SSN,
financial information, other...)
1. If so:
a. How often do you send sensitive information and what kind of
information do you send?
b. Do you ever hesitate, to do this for security purposes?
c. Do you delete the sensitive email after sending it?
2. If not:
a. In what situations can you see yourself sending sensitive
information?
b. How often would you expect this to happen?
c. Would you delete the sensitive email after sending it?
10. Stop the screen recorder. Stop the audio recording.

B.1.5

Participant A Qualtrics Survey
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B.1.6

Participant A Worksheets
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MessageGuard - A.1 Worksheet
In this task, you’ll be using MessageGuard - A. Go to h
 ttps://a.messageguard.io and get the tool.
Please encrypt and send the following information to your friend using MessageGuard – A:
●
●

SSN: 979-65-3363
PIN: 1988

Enter the confirmation code provided by your friend:

Enter the PIN provided by your friend:

Once you have received the confirmation code and PIN from your friend, send an email to your friend
letting them know you received this information. After you have sent this confirmation email, let the
study coordinator know you have finished this task.

MessageGuard - B.1 Worksheet
In this task, you’ll be using MessageGuard - B. Go to h
 ttps://b.messageguard.io and get the tool.
Please encrypt and send the following information to your friend using MessageGuard – B
●
●

SSN: 264-94-8748
PIN: 6567

Enter the confirmation code provided by your friend:

Enter the PIN provided by your friend:

Once you have received the confirmation code and PIN from your friend, send an email to your friend
letting them know you received this information. After you have sent this confirmation email, let the
study coordinator know you have finished this task.

MessageGuard - A.2 Worksheet
In this task, you need to go back to your email to retrieve the confirmation code and confirmation PIN
you received from your friend in the last task.

If you cannot retrieve the information, please notify the study coordinator.

Enter the confirmation code you retrieved from your email:

Enter the PIN you retrieved from your email:

Once you have retrieved the information, let the study coordinator know you have finished this task.

MessageGuard - B.2 Worksheet
In this task, you need to go back to your email to retrieve the confirmation code and confirmation PIN
you received from your friend in the last task.

If you cannot retrieve the information, please notify the study coordinator.

Enter the confirmation code you retrieved from your email:

Enter the PIN you retrieved from your email:

Once you have retrieved the confirmation code and PIN from your email, take the appropriate action
to make sure any emails containing this information are inaccessible. After ensuring emails containing
this information are inaccessible, let the study coordinator know you have finished this task.

B.1.7

Participant B Qualtrics Survey
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B.1.8

Participant B Worksheets
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MessageGuard - A.1 Worksheet
You have completed your friend’s taxes and need to send them the confirmation code and this year’s tax
PIN from their tax submission.

Since your friend used MessageGuard - A to send sensitive information to you, please also use
MessageGuard - A to send them the confirmation code and PIN.
●
●

Confirmation code: LDDLDHVO
PIN: 3866

Once you have sent the confirmation code and PIN to your friend, wait for them to reply to you and
confirm they got the information. Once you have gotten this confirmation, let the study coordinator
know you have finished this task.

MessageGuard - A.2 Worksheet
In this task, you need to go back to your email to retrieve the confirmation code and confirmation PIN
you received from your friend in the last task.

If you cannot retrieve the information, please notify the study coordinator.

Enter the SSN you retrieved from your email:

Enter the PIN you retrieved from your email:

Once you have retrieved the information, let the study coordinator know you have finished this task.

MessageGuard - B.2 Worksheet
In this task, you need to go back to your email to retrieve the confirmation code and confirmation PIN
you received from your friend in the last task.

If you cannot retrieve the information, please notify the study coordinator.

Enter the SSN you retrieved from your email:

Enter the PIN you retrieved from your email:

Once you have retrieved the confirmation code and PIN from your email, take the appropriate action
to make sure any emails containing this information are inaccessible. After ensuring emails containing
this information are inaccessible, let the study coordinator know you have finished this task.

MessageGuard - B.2 Worksheet
You have completed your friend’s taxes and need to send them the confirmation code and this year’s tax
PIN from their tax submission.

Since your friend used MessageGuard - B to send sensitive information to you, please also use
MessageGuard - B to send them the confirmation code and PIN.
●
●

Confirmation code: OLOWXTUU
PIN: 8111

Once you have sent the confirmation code and PIN to your friend, wait for them to reply to you and
confirm they got the information. Once you have gotten this confirmation, let the study coordinator
know you have finished this task.

General Worksheet
Please wait for your friend’s email with their last year’s tax PIN and SSN.

Enter your friend’s SSN. Include dashes.

Enter your friend’s PIN.

Once you have written down your friend’s SSN and PIN, let the study coordinator know that you are
ready to reply to your friend with their confirmation code and PIN.

B.1.9

Exit Interview Questions

1. Tell me about your experience using these tools.
2. What are some things that stood out to you? Why?
3. What did you like about the two tools? Why?
4. What did you not like about them? Why?
5. In the first,second tool, an email thread has a lifespan of 1 month. Do you think
this is a good default for expiration timing?
6. How much control would you want over setting expiration times? Would you like to
explicitly decide for each email thread, or would you rather the tool do it all for
your?
7. What did you think about the red expiration labels? Would you want these kinds
of indicators in a tool that expires messages?
8. Of the two tools you tested, which one did you feel was more secure and why?
9. Of the two tools you tested, which one did you trust more and why?
10. Without a tool like this, how long do your emails exist in your inbox before they
are deleted?
11. How likely are you to use tool A or tool B in the future?
12. To what degree are you worried about the permanence of your emails and messages
on your mobile devices, laptops, desktops, or other devices? Why?
13. To what degree are you worried about the permanence of your information on the
Internet in general?
14. Would you like to use a tool that makes your messages unreadable after a certain
period of time? Why?
15. Do you ever send sensitive information through email?
16. In the first,second tool, you could choose to expire an encrypted thread by pushing
the “Make Unreadable” button, or you could wait until the timer ran up before
choosing to expire or retain the encrypted thread.
(a) Is there another way you would prefer to manage expired encrypted emails?
(b) For example, would you rather have the tool take care of it for you and not
ask you?
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17. Did you like the pop up asking you to manage expired messages? If not, how would
you like to have it work instead?
18. In the first,second tool, the encrypted emails on one thread were all protected
together and expired together.
(a) Is there another way you would prefer to have these expirable encrypted
messages protected?
(b) For example, would you prefer each message protected by itself, or would you
rather have all encrypted messages from all contacts over a period of time be
protected?
B.2

Participant Demographics - Extended

The extended demographic data can be seen in Table B.1.
B.3

System Usability Scale

This section of the appendix contains details on the System Usability Scale.
B.3.1

SUS Likert Questions

1. I think that I would like to use this system frequently.
2. I found the system unnecessarily complex.
3. I thought the system was easy to use.
4. I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this
system.
5. I found the various functions in this system were well integrated.
6. I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system.
7. I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly.
8. I found the system very cumbersome to use.
9. I felt very confident using the system.
10. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system.
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Gender

Age

Education

Computer Expertise

Occupation or Major

Total

%

Male
Female
Prefer not to answer

22
26
0

46%
54%
0%

18–24 years old
25–34 years old
35–44 years old
45–54 years old
55 years or older

33
11
1
2
1

69%
23%
2%
4%
2%

Some school
High school graduate
Some college
College or university degree
Post-secondary education
Prefer not to answer

0
2
30
13
3
0

0%
4%
63%
27%
6%
0%

Beginner
Intermediate
Advanced

8
32
8

16%
66%
16%

4
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1

9%
2%
4%
4%
4%
2%
2%
4%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
4%
2%
4%
4%
4%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
4%
2%
2%
2%
2%

Mechanical Engineering
Web Designer
Vocal Performance
Dietetics
Electrical Engineering
Experience Design and Management
Marriage and Family Studies
Computer Engineering
Exercise and Wellness
Advertising
Editor
Chiropractic Practitioner
Music Education
Astronomy
Piano Performance
Student
Child Life Specialist
Studio Art
Pre–Illustration
Civil Engineering
Cosmotologist
Accounting
Computer Science
Biochemistry
History
Linguistics
Biodiversity and Conservation
Education
Bioinformatics
Piano Performance
Mathematics
Psychology
Finance
Secretary
Assessment Librarian
Unknown

Table B.1: Participant Demographics Extended
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B.3.2

SUS Score Calculation Method

SUS scores are calculated using the following method:
1. For each of the even numbered questions calculate: 5 - <the Likert score of the
question>
2. For each of the odd numbered questions calculate: <the Likert score of the question>
-1
3. Add this calculated values together to get TOTAL
4. Multiply TOTAL by 2.5 to get the SUS score
Example
Question

Likert Score

Calculated Score

1

5

4

2

1

4

3

4

3

4

2

3

5

4

3

6

1

4

7

3

2

8

3

2

9

5

4

10

4

1

Sum Total

30
x2.5

SUS Score

163

75

